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Abstract
This study examines how fund age empirically affects the performance of Nordic mutual
funds. Our research questions are motivated by a high level of investments in actively
managed funds in the Nordic countries, yet we consider determinants of the abnormal
returns that these funds achieve to be understudied. The data set is free of survivorship
bias, and consists of 1198(net, 1138 gross) Nordic equity funds between January 2006
and February 2021. Employing multivariate panel regressions, controlling for other fund
characteristics, we investigate how fund age affects performance in terms of both before-
and after-fee returns on a risk-adjusted basis. Second, we research how age affects how
funds are exposed to different types of risk, and whether it is affecting their investment
style. Further, we investigate whether portfolios sorted by fund age are able to outperform
risk-factor benchmarks. Lastly, we research persistence within age quintiles.
When controlling for fund attributes that typically affect fund performance, such as the
size and expense ratio of the fund, we find the relationship to be significantly positive,
i.e., that older funds perform better. We find evidence that that older funds are less
exposed towards total, market and unsystematic risk. We also find that investment styles
significantly differ across fund age, as older funds are more exposed to the four risk factors
proposed by Fama and French (2015b). We find that long-short portfolios of young
and old funds are not able to achieve risk-adjusted returns. Lastly, by employing an
analysis of persistence, we find evidence that neither old or young funds continue to out-
or underperform over a time period of one year.
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1 Introduction
The ongoing pandemic is influencing our consumption and saving decisions. One effect
is a surge of private capital entering the financial markets. In Norway, private investors
doubled their mutual fund investments in 2020 compared to 2019 (Bjørnestad, 2020).
For almost a century, private and institutional investors have been investing in open-ended
mutual funds. With increasingly easier access, the fund industry has grown dramatically
over the recent decades. Globally, the total mutual fund industry managed assets exceeding
63 trillion USD at the end of 2020, compared to only 6 trillion USD at the end of 1996.
The US alone manages more than 29 trillion USD, constituting roughly 47% of the global
AUM (assets under management), at the end of 2020. The fund industry in the Nordic
countries is small in comparison. At the year-end of 2020, Sweden, Denmark, Norway,
and Finland manage 518, 177, 175, and 127 billion USD, respectively, which in aggregate
is a little less than 1 trillion USD. Nevertheless, since 1996, the Nordics have experienced
much higher growth in AUM than the US, with almost 18.000% compared with 8.000%.
Not only the industry size measured in AUM has increased rapidly, but the number of
mutual funds has also risen significantly, from about 35,000 funds in 1996 to 126,000 funds
globally at the end of 2020 (Investment Company Institute, 1997, 2021).
Mutual funds offer investors broad exposure to the general risk of financial markets,
while requiring little knowledge about individual stocks and whether they are priced
correctly. There is overwhelming evidence that actively managed mutual funds on average
underperform passive benchmarks net of fees (Malkiel, 1995; Fama and French, 2010), yet
private investors in Norway place 81% of their total mutual fund placement in actively
managed funds (Bjørnestad, 2020). More professional investors, such as pension funds
and insurance companies, place 59% in active funds.
Despite the evidence that passive index funds outperform actively managed funds on
average, Kosowski (2011) find that active mutual funds significantly outperform passive
during recessions. As we are in the midst of a recession due to the Covid-19 pandemic
(National Bureau of Economic Researcht, 2021), investing in active funds may be a
reasonable choice – if one is able to choose the right ones.
With an increased number of funds and other investment options, it is imperative that
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investors research how attributes of these may affect performance. To what extent an
active fund is able to outperform it benchmark is found to not only depend on the fund’s
skill in finding investment opportunities, but also on constraints that the fund faces. One
such constraint discussed in recent literature is the concept of decreasing returns to scale,
that larger funds have a harder time achieving abnormal returns because of their larger
size Chen et al. (2004); Ľuboš Pástor et al. (2015).
While fund size is covered in many studies, fund age often serves as a control variable.
The theoretical outcomes are that performance either increases or decreases as funds
age. Increased performance may be due to accumulation of skill and experience, or it
may decrease due to increasing fund size (Chen et al., 2004), increased complexity of the
fund, or slack. New funds may outperform when they are new because of advantages in
technological knowledge, but with constant development, such effects are expected to be
eradicated over time.
Studies of fund characteristics in the US are to a large extent reporting that fund age
is either deteriorating performance (Ľuboš Pástor et al., 2015; Karoui and Meier, 2009),
or not a determinant of performance at all (Chen et al., 2004; Ferreira et al., 2013). In
larger-scale studies that include European countries, it is often found that performance is
deteriorating as funds age (Otten and Bams, 2002; Ferreira et al., 2013; Filip, 2018). The
academic landscape on fund characteristics in the Nordic countries is scarce, and may
even refrain from including fund age in their model (Dahlquist et al., 2000).
This thesis aims to narrow what we find to be a literature gap in studies of how fund age
affects fund performance in the Nordic fund industry.
The review of literature advance four hypotheses that this thesis investigates:
Hypothesis 1: Fund age affects the performance of mutual funds
Hypothesis 2: Fund age affects risk-taking of mutual funds
Hypothesis 3: Fund age affects the investment style of mutual funds
Hypothesis 4: Investment strategies based on fund age outperform on a
risk-adjusted basis
We find several arguments that we believe support these hypotheses. Ľuboš Pástor et al.
(2015) find that the negative age-performance turns positive after controlling for fund
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size and fund industry size, implying that funds learn on the job. Outside of the US, the
diseconomies of scale related to increased fund size are not as evident, and with some
evidence of an adverse effect of age on performance (Otten and Bams, 2002) we may
expect to find the same in Nordic countries. Karoui and Meier (2009) find younger funds
to exhibit higher levels of total and unsystematic risk, and Chevalier and Ellison (1997)
find that younger funds tend to increase their level of risk at the end of evaluation periods
when they have performed poorly. As Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) and Chan et al.
(2002) explain, younger funds tend to deviate less from benchmarks because of higher
higher fund-flow sensitivity. Karoui and Meier (2009) suggests that younger funds are
more inclined to invest in smaller cap and less liquid stocks, exposing them to the SMB
factor of Fama and French (1993). Portfolios of young funds are found to outperform
older funds (Ľuboš Pástor et al., 2015; Karoui and Meier, 2009), and there is evidence
that younger funds display stronger persistence (Verbeek and Huij, 2006).
To answer our hypotheses, we gather a data set free of survivorship bias that contains
1198(net, 1138 gross) Nordic equity funds, covering January 2006 to February 2021. To
evaluate risk-adjusted performance, we apply the one-,three-, four- and five-factor models
on both net and gross returns. First, we apply multivariate regressions where risk adjusted
performance, risk-taking measures, and investment styles are our dependent variables. We
regress these on fund age and other fund attributes related to performance, such as fund
size, expense ratio, and the number of stocks each fund is holding at the time. Further,
we apply the same factor models on a hypothetical zero-investment portfolio that is long
in young funds and old funds, as and test whether these age-sorted portfolios are able to
show persistent performance.
The empirical results indicate that performance increase with a higher fund age in our
sample of Nordic mutual funds, which contradicts evidence from other economies(Ferreira
et al., 2013). Performing robustness tests suggests that this finding is mostly based on
the most recent data. Further, we find funds to reduce their risk exposure as they age.
Older funds also develop strategies that expose them more towards risk factors introduced
by Fama and French (2015b). However, we do not find long-short portfolios of young
and old funds ti achieve risk-adjusted returns, and neither age group shows evidence of
persistence.
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Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. The study examines how age
affects the performance of funds, and makes an effort to understand how age and other
fund characteristics influence their risk propensity and investment style. Contrary to most
empirical evidence that finds performance deteriorates as funds grow older (Ferreira et al.,
2013), we find that fund age has a positive effect on performance of up to 10 basis points
a year, depending on performance measure. The issue is of great practical importance to
both investors and academics alike. First of all, investors may take the fund attribute
age into account when making an investment decision. Second, fund managers may use
favorable results in marketing. Third, the study will enhance the knowledge about how
the attribute affects performance in academia.
The thesis proceeds as follows: In section 2, we provide a literature review of the most
relevant research on the topic to place this thesis in the landscape of previous research.
Section 3 presents our hypotheses. Section 4 describes our data set and the variables we
employ in the study. Section 5 defines the models and techniques which we implement in




Does the age of mutual funds matter? This section aims to place this thesis in the academic
landscape surrounding research on mutual funds, and to motivate our hypotheses.
2.0.1 Why Mutual Funds?
Studies on the effect of age on fund performance is often focused on hedge funds, which
are not available to most investors. Mutual funds investing, which is available to most
investors, make up a larger fraction of the overall investment universe. Compared to
hedge funds, mutual funds are also more strictly regulated and are required to disclose
more information to the public. This transparency can avoid conflicts of interest and
agency costs. Furthermore, to ensure a more homogeneous sample, we look specifically
at open-ended mutual funds. As opposed to closed-end mutual funds, open-ended funds
have an unlimited number of shares. Investor funds are pooled, and the returns directly
follow the change in the fund’s net asset value. A consequence of having to readjust the
funds’ holdings each day to meet investors in- and outflows is higher operational costs,
impeding investors’ returns. Another characteristic of open-ended funds is that they must
maintain a certain cash reserve to meet sudden shareholder redemptions, which may also
lead to lower returns. These drawbacks are however compensated by the flexibility and
liquidity that open-ended funds offer.
Another aspect that drives our motivation to focus on open-ended funds is that each
share is only priced by its underlying assets. The price of closed-ended funds are, by
their nature of limited supply, affected by the supply and demand for the fund, and the
price may, as a result, be discounted or get a premium. We consider these effects neither
relevant nor helpful in answering our research question.
2.0.2 Measuring Performance
Funds as an investment vehicle were founded upon the idea that exposure towards
the broad market returns a better risk-adjusted return than simple exposure towards
idiosyncratic risks of companies. The idea was popularized by Markowitz’s portfolio
theory (Markowitz, 1952), which argues that only diversifiable risk should carry a risk
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premium, in other words, a reward. The consecutive development of the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (Treynor, 1961; Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966) puts forward a
model to explain how the systematic risk of an investment should affect expected returns.
As the models assume a relationship between risk and expected returns, they have evolved
to become performance benchmarks. The models were by some researchers found to be
less relevant after they were published, which led to the development of new and improved
models covering risk factors not previously explained (Basu, 1983; Rosenberg et al., 1985;
Carhart, 1997; Fama and French, 2015a).
Ever since the original CAPM model was developed, studies find that active mutual fund
managers are not able to outperform the market portfolio consistently to a sufficient degree
that covers the fees of the fund (Sharpe, 1964; Malkiel, 1995)). In a comprehensive study
of 27 countries covering 16,313 funds, Ferreira et al. (2013) document that equity mutual
funds around the world underperform by 20 basis points per quarter after fees, after
adjusting for the four risk-factors of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). French
(2008) finds that on average, investors would be better off by 0.7% per year by switching
from active management to index funds. (Graham et al., 2019) show evidence supporting
that few mutual funds, both in the US and Europe, outperform their benchmarks or
justify their high fees. Studies on domestic mutual funds in Nordic countries also suggest
little evidence of active mutual funds outperforming a passive benchmark (Sørensen, 2009;
Christensen, 2013; Sandvall, 2000; Flam and Vestman, 2014). The overall consensus seems
to be that the average active mutual fund cannot outperform the market.
Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) dissected the relationship between skill and reward in the
mutual fund industry. They point to the overall conclusion of existing literature, such as
Gruber (1996), that there is no clear empirical evidence of consistent stock-picking skill, yet
fund managers are paid top dollar. This breach of economic principles related to assigning
a high value to skill that is neither of short supply nor of value-adding nature was truly
mind-boggling. Their research conclude on a tight relationship between compensation
and value added, and that current compensation predicts future performance.
Despite there being much evidence that active funds underperform their benchmark
on average, some do outperform. Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) found that 43% of
managers were able to outperform the benchmark. Even if the average fund manager
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does not give reason to believe that securities markets are efficient1, there still may be
some managers that persistently do outperform. Their main findings are that skilled
fund managers are able to create value, and that their efforts to a high degree end up as
compensation to the managers instead of the investors.
Considering the extensive research on fund manager skill, such as the highly influential
paper written by Berk and van Binsbergen (2015), it seems to be evident that the fund
managers capture much (if not all) of the value created. Despite the overwhelming
evidence that the fund manager collects most of the surplus they create, compared to
an appropriate benchmark, they do add value in the form of implementation - the asset
owner may not be able to create the benchmark themselves. However, the implementation
is cheaper through index funds.
2.1 Research on Funds Characteristics
"Is there any way by which the investor can assure himself of better than average results
by choosing the right funds? If not, how can he avoid choosing funds that will give him
worse than average results?" - Graham (1973)
Graham (1973), author of The Intelligent Investor, demonstrates that active funds
outperformed both S&P 500 and DJIA during the 1960s. Already when the book was
published in 1973, smaller funds were observed to achieve higher returns. However, can
investors obtain this performance without paying a premium? To uncover an investment
strategy that systematically outperforms other alternative strategies signifies a market
inefficiency that the observant investor can exploit.
As Graham et al. (2019, p. 17) puts it: "From a regulator’s perspective, the purpose of
knowing the conditions that affect the performance of funds is to evaluate the relevance of
including information on these conditions in the advertising of managers". Graham et al.
(2019) compare how fund characteristics affect funds performance in the US and Europe,
and suggest that most characteristics have a somewhat inconclusive effect on returns. We
will in the next section discuss fund age and its empirical effect on performance, followed
by a presentation of literature on other related fund characteristics.
1Following the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama, 1970), stating that outperformance only signifies
luck.
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2.1.1 Fund Age
Choosing an active fund does, to a larger extent than when choosing a passive one, raise
the attention towards the fund managers’ skill. To assess the skill of a fund in any way,
one would need a track record. When funds are young, they have not yet established a
track record. This issue is not as relevant when investing in index funds, given that skill
is not what you pay for.
The theoretical outcomes are that performance either increases or decreases as funds
age. It may increase due to accumulation of skill and experience, or it may decrease due
to increasing fund size (Chen et al., 2004), increased complexity of the fund, or slack.
New funds may outperform when they are new because of advantages in technological
knowledge, but with constant development such effects are expected to be eradicated over
time.
Howell (2001) investigates how the performance of hedge funds is related to their age. The
author finds a robust negative relationship between returns and the age of the fund, that
there is a slow and constant erosion of performance. However, hedge funds are organized
and mandated somewhat differently than mutual funds, as they are not available to every
investor. Managers of hedge funds may also have a stronger incentive to deliver good
results when the fund is new, as the energy put into creating a good track record is what
will ensure in-flows. Hedge funds are more susceptible to attrition because of this, as
almost 9% of funds die each year, which is caused by "chronic" poor performance (Bianchi
and Drew, 2010), with mutual funds having half the rate.
Another argument supporting young funds outperforming old is that hedge funds are
established because of opportunity to exploit a niche that is not yet correctly priced.
Investigating more than 11,000 hedge funds, PerTrac (2011) report that in 13 out of the
15 years between 1996 and 2010, young funds(less than 2 years) have outperformed both
mid-age(2-4 years) and tenured funds(4+ years), and young have achieved more than
twice the cumulative total return over the period. In terms of size, small funds outperform
in good years, but performed the worst during 2008.
The research conducted to understand the relationship between the age and returns
of mutual funds is inconclusive and seemingly given less attention than other fund
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characteristics. To mechanically extrapolate the relationship between age and performance
within the hedge fund industry to mutual funds would however not be appropriate. Webster
(2002) finds no significant relationship between fund age and raw returns of American
mutual funds. However, the market-adjusted return to deteriorates over time. Despite
deteriorating market adjusted returns, they find indications of a positive relationship
between manager tenure and performance. Filip (2018) report similar findings in a study
of the polish equity fund market - age influences performance in a negative way.
In one of the first studies on how fund characteristics affect fund performance, Chevalier and
Ellison (1997) find that younger funds are more risky, and that their flow-to-performance
sensitivity is higher than for older funds. Chevalier and Ellison (1999a) also find that as
funds age it becomes more probable to survive and Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) find
that younger managers are more easily fired following poor performance, which may result
in lower risk-taking and more benchmark-like investment style.
Ferreira et al. (2013) comparings performance determinants across geographical areas.
Their findings indicate that there is no relation between age and performance in the US2,
but that there is a negative relationship found outside of the US. The negative effect
of fund age on performance is supported by Otten and Bams (2002), covering France,
Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
Ľuboš Pástor et al. (2015) finds a negative age-performance relation that holds both
within and across funds, a relationship that disappears when controlling for the industry
size. They suggest that skill improves as funds grow older, but the effect is overshadowed
by the performance erosion caused by the growing fund industry size and competitiveness.
Karoui and Meier (2009) find that young funds perform better, and that the outperformance
lasts for up to three years. They further find young funds to exhibit higher total and
unsystematic risk, and that they are more invested in smaller and less liquid stocks.
2.1.2 Fund Characteristics Related to Fund Age
Studies of fund characteristics often debate how some effects interact with each other.
Research by Chen et al. (2004) and Busse et al. (2013) explain that effects of fund size
2The insignificant effect of fund age on performance in the US is supported by Chen et al. (2004) and
Busse et al. (2013).
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may be determined by the age of the fund, as young funds tend to be small. If other fund
characteristics affect returns, they may affect the lifespan of funds. How, and whether,
empirical evidence control for these variables affect our interpretations and expectations
of how fund age affects performance. In this section, we investigate characteristics that
are not fixed across a funds lifetime, but are still found to determine the performance of
funds.
2.1.2.1 Fund Size
Chen et al. (2004) was one of the first to evaluate what they call the erosion effect, with a
data set covering 1962 to 1999. They argue that many alpha opportunities lie in illiquid
segments, which are harder to capture for large funds. The argument is supported by Yan
(2008) and Busse et al. (2013), who also find that large funds underperform because they
prefer stocks with sufficient liquidity. Consistent with such liquidity constraints, mutual
fund trading is found to exert substantial price pressure in the equity markets (Edelen
et al., 2007), usually referred to as diseconomies of scale. Ľuboš Pástor et al. (2015) find
that performance deteriorates as the size of the fund increases, as well as when time
passes because the industry grows and becomes more competitive. Thus, good investment
strategies may be hard to scale, and diseconomies of scale may be a common issue.
Ferreira et al. (2013) find evidence of differences in the determinants of fund performance
across economies. In the US, there is a significantly negative effect of fund size on
performance, however, it is positive outside of the US. Among Nordic countries, they find
that performance is negatively related to size in Denmark, while the opposite is found in
Finland, Norway and Sweden(Ferreira et al., 2013). The relationship found by Chen et al.
(2004) is therefore not universal. Ferreira et al. (2013) remark that US mutual funds are
five times larger than non-US funds on average in their sample.
The influential article by Berk and Green (2004) establishes a relationship between the
past performance of a fund and its current inflow, current size is a determinant of past
performance (Berk and Green, 2004). Ferreira et al. (2013) finds similar relationship
between inflow and performance, but only for funds outside of the US.
In the Swedish equity market, Dahlquist et al. (2000) find an adverse effect of fund size
on performance, however, the authors do not control for fund age.
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2.1.2.2 Fees - The Cost of Management
The compensation scheme of fund managers has been changing over the course of years.
Today, fees are usually based on assets under management (AUM), and according to
Ang (2014) they represent 85% of revenue for financial advisor firms. A peculiar effect
of fees proportional to the assets under management is that managers are rewarded by
general market growth. The expense ratio that a mutual fund charges for its management
services consists of both direct management fees, as well as recurring expenses related to
marketing and administration. Loads are also a form of compensation that either takes
form as sales charge on purchase, or as deferred sales charge when the fund shares are
liquidated (Ang, 2014).
Even with some evidence that higher fees does not increase investor returns (Chen et al.,
2004), or rather, on the contrary, shrinks them (Carhart, 1997; Gruber, 1996; Otten and
Bams, 2002), investors do not seem to react to regular expense ratios. They only react to
those that visibly incur when buying the fund, such as loads and commissions (Barber
et al., 2005). Moreover, Gruber (1996) also finds investors to be insensitive to fund fees
and after-fee performance.
Golec (1996) find that in some cases, higher fees signify superior investment skill, which
may lead to better performance. In contrast, Otten and Bams (2002) reports a negative
relationship between European mutual fund performance and fees. Ferreira et al. (2013)
finds that the performance of all the countries in the sample is negatively related to
expense ratio, except for Finland.
Other costs that incur, but are not publicly disclosed, are related to commissions (trade
frequency), bid-ask spreads (liquidity), and the market-impact effect (relative size of
positions). According to Edelen et al. (2007)), these costs exceed that of the fund’s
expense-ratio. Carhart (1997) provide evidence that the act of trading, and therefore
exposing the assets to the previously mentioned costs, indeed impacts the performance of
funds in a negative way. Trading costs, therefore, are proportional to turnover. Ľuboš
Pástor et al. (2017) find the opposite, and relates the positive component to funds trading
in less liquid stocks and funds likely to have more skill.
In essence, fund characteristics such as the size of the fund and its costs of operation do
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not only display inconsistent effects on performance; they may also relate to fund flows
and how fund ages.
2.2 Performance Persistence
There is a broad consensus that to assess the skill of a fund or the manager, achieving
high performance is not sufficient. Following the Efficient Market Hypothesis, excess
returns are due to luck, not skill (Fama, 1970). The notion that skill exists in the fund
management industry must imply that funds that perform well (or poorly) continue to
do so (Grinblatt and Titman, 1992). If the outperformance persists over time, however,
the probability of it being due to luck decreases. Following this reasoning, persistency
is often used to measure skill. The earliest literature suggests that persistence exists in
the US, finding strong evidence of persistence in a one year evaluation horizon (Grinblatt
and Titman, 1992; Hendricks et al., 1993; Goetzmann and Ibbotson, 1994). However,
Phelps and Detzel (1997) argues that persistence disappears when considering other time
horizons or other performance measures. Carhart (1997) found that the momentum factor
introduced by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), when combined with the factor model by
Fama and French (1993), explain most of the persistence in fund returns. Yet, there are
still some evidence that short-term persistence exists Bollen and Busse (2005).
Berk and Green (2004) developed a model that attempts to explain the common trends
observed in the performance and persistence of mutual fund returns. The model assumes
that investors are able to observe past abnormal performance of funds, and reward the best
performers. Further, they assume that the total cost of a fund follows a positive quadratic
relationship with fund size. The implication is that funds with good performance will
increase in AUM, until an equilibrium between performance and expense is reached. The
model explains why abnormal returns are rare, and that persistence seldom lasts long.
A more recent study by Vidal-García (2013) examines the persistence of mutual fund
returns in six European countries, and finds statistically and economically significant
performance persistence for time horizons for up to 36 months, however, most pronounced
by the top and bottom performers. Ferreira et al. (2013) finds evidence of short-run
persistence, but only for US funds. Further, Verbeek and Huij (2006) finds that younger
funds display stronger persistence among both top and bottom performers.
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Despite some evidence both for and against the existence of persistency in mutual funds
performance, the consensus is that its existence seems to be a short-lived phenomenon
(Malkiel, 1995; Otten and Bams, 2002; Bollen and Busse, 2005; Vidal-García et al., 2016)3.
2.3 Why Nordic Countries?
Comparing mutual fund performance across different economies can indicate differences in
fund manager culture or even the investor’s ability to attain and act on available empirical
evidence, such as the research mentioned previously.
Ferreira et al. (2013) performed a large cross-country study of determinants of performance
in actively managed equity funds in 27 countries. One of their findings is that age plays
no significant role in determining performance in the US, but indicates a negative impact
in European countries. Further, the diminishing returns to scale that are found in the
US by this study, and well as other studies (Chen et al., 2004; Ľuboš Pástor et al., 2015),
does not seem to be a universal truth. They find that the scale effect in the US is related
to liquidity restraints faced by funds that have to invest in small and domestic stock, by
virtue of their style. They find that countries with liquid stock markets and strong legal
institutions display better performance. Nordic countries may therefore yield results that
differ from studies of the US fund market.
Performance studies in the Nordic countries have shown similar results as in other markets,
that actively managed funds do not outperform benchmarks net of fees. Moreover, most
Nordic countries show little evidence of persistence, also similar to evidence found in the
US (Christensen, 2013; Sørensen, 2009; Flam and Vestman, 2014; Dahlquist et al., 2000).
In a study of the Finnish mutual fund market, however, both past winners and losers were
able to outperform the benchmark the subsequent period (Sandvall, 2000). In a larger
scale and more comparative study, Vidal-García et al. (2016) finds Denmark to attain
the highest level of performance and persistence among Nordic mutual funds, and that
Sweden is the worst performer on both performance and persistence in their data set of
35 countries.
3Bollen and Busse (2005) also finds some evidence that persistence exists in lower liquidity sectors,
which we believe that Nordic funds are more able to benefit following the fund size argument of Ferreira
et al. (2013).
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Investor sophistication has been investigated in the Norwegian mutual fund market by
Tykhonova and Akulenka (2020). They reported that Norwegian mutual fund investors
were unlikely to be sophisticated, as investors are inclined to outsource risk adjustment
to Morningstar ratings. Morningstar rating outperforms all asset pricing models and
market-adjusted returns in predicting the direction of fund flows. As Morningstar ratings
are found to serve no predictive properties of future performance (Graham et al., 2019),
these findings contradict the flow-to-skill found by Berk and Green (2004). This leads
us to believe that there are inefficiencies in the Nordic mutual fund market, which fund
characteristics may be able to explain.
Chan et al. (2002) claim that the choice of investment style is not only driven by
maximizing portfolio returns and diversification. The fund managers’ and investment
companies’ interests may also influence the choice of investment style. Personal career
concerns, and that they usually are evaluated over short time horizons, may induce funds to
play safe and avoid deviating too much from the most typical benchmarks, such as the S&P
500. By doing so, managers hope to avoid being penalized for under-performance, while
sacrificing opportunities to outperform. With the same argument, Chevalier and Ellison
(1999b) also find that younger funds are less likely to deviate from market benchmarks,
using a sample of US. mutual funds. The Nordic countries are almost always among the
highest-ranked in studies of happiness, state of democracy, political rights, gender equality
and trust between citizens. More than 70% of workers in Nordic countries are covered
by at least one collective bargaining agreement, compared to 11% in the US (Torp and
Reiersen, 2020). These social characteristics may alleviate the career concerns of fund
managers in Nordic countries.
Fund attributes are scarcely studied in the Nordic countries, and this paper serves as an
attempt to fill this gap. Investigating the age of the fund, being given less attention, is
also motivated by the differing empirical findings in terms of diminishing returns to scale
internationally. The combination of tools we use to investigate how fund age affects fund
performance is also of scarce matter. Furthermore, most studies focus on domestic funds,
while we cover all available funds within the domiciles. The lack of clarity of whether the




Considering the existing literature on mutual fund performance, the age of the fund is most
often assigned the role of a control variable. However, the fact that fund age is included
for this purpose signifies its empirical importance. As our reviewed literature suggests,
the relationship between the fund’s age and performance is less clear. The purpose of our
study is to close what we perceive as a literature gap on a fund characteristic, and to do
so within the Nordic mutual fund industry where such studies are scarce. In the next
section, we will address this purpose by presenting our empirical research questions.
Hypothesis 1: Fund age affects the performance of mutual funds
Existing research on how fund age affects performance is to a high degree inconclusive.
However, it is most often suggested that older funds perform worse than young funds
outside the US. (Ferreira et al., 2013). Previous research that either directly assesses fund
characteristics, or include them as control variables, may not take survivorship bias into
account, resulting in upward an bias in the performance of especially young funds. Age
and size are usually correlated - older funds tend to be larger. Increased fund size implies
lower marginal costs of management but may do so at the cost of diseconomy of scale
(Chen et al., 2004). Small funds are preconditioned to be more agile if market conditions
change abruptly, and quickly rebalance its portfolio without being a price mover. These
findings lead us to expect that there are differences between young and old mutual funds,
in terms of risk-adjusted performance.
Hypothesis 2: Fund age affects risk-taking of mutual funds
The second research question we raise is that of risk-taking behavior. Following the notion
that young funds tend to be more agile, they may also be less inclined to avoid volatility.
We expect our findings to follow the findings posed by Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and
Karoui and Meier (2009), suggesting that younger funds are incentivized to increase their
risk towards year-end if they have performed poorly. We are therefore lead to expect that
funds become less risky when they age.
Hypothesis 3: Fund age affects the investment style of mutual funds
New funds may be created to take advantage of a new niche, or to otherwise create
16
value to investors by utilizing a managers’ specialized knowledge about certain markets
or certain risk-premia anomalies. Investment style is related to how a funds allocate its
assets. Enlightened by the fact that young and old funds are inherently different in terms
of characteristics, such as size - we expect to find that young and old funds also follow
different investment styles.
Hypothesis 4: Investment strategies based on fund age outperform on a risk-adjusted basis
Even if age may not have causal implications on performance, we want to investigate
whether it is possible for investors to consistently outperform a benchmark by trading
funds based on their age. In the US, Ľuboš Pástor et al. (2015) and Karoui and Meier
(2009) find that portfolios sorted on young funds outperform older funds. If a portfolio
long in young funds and short in old funds outperform, this may indicate that new funds
that enter the fund management industry are more skilled. With indications of a negative
age-performance relation outside of the US, we expect to find similar results.
Verbeek and Huij (2006) finds stronger persistence in young funds. Further, persistence is
found to be stronger in less liquid sectors (Busse et al., 2013), which Nordic funds could




To assess the performance differences across age in the Nordic mutual fund industry, we
obtain and structure a large amount of data. Our data sources and details on the sample
selection will be presented in this chapter.
4.1 Data Sources and Sample Selection
We obtain monthly mutual fund data from the Morningstar Direct database. All data
is obtained in USD, to be better able to compare data on an equal basis. We include
both surviving and non-surviving funds in our data sample, to avoid survivorship bias.
Attrition of non-surviving funds is likely to bias the sample towards better performing
funds because funds that disappear tend to perform poorly prior to their dissolution
(Elton et al., 1996; Brown et al., 2015). More on data biases in subsection 4.4.1.
Our study considers the mainland Nordic countries (Norway, Finland, Sweden and
Denmark). This implies selecting mutual funds that are domicile to one of the Nordic
countries. We include mutual funds investing within and outside their domicile country.
Focusing solely on mutual funds that only invest within their home domicile is restrictive
and would reduce our sample significantly. The total survivorship bias free sample available
in the Morningstar Direct database for this area is 1956 funds. We are specifically looking
at data between January 2006 and February of 2021. By removing all funds that are
obsolete before our period of interest, our new number of funds is 1804 (net) and 1667
(gross)4.
We use end of month observations of each funds’ NAV (net asset value) to calculate
returns, which we ensure by using the last observation carried forward. For example, if the
31st of January is on a Sunday, the last observation of the month would be from Friday
29th. This ensures that we do not lose any data due to inconsistency in reporting dates.
Monthly returns are included first when they have an entire month of returns, i.e., funds
that start trading in the middle of a month will be attributed their first return the
4This sample is used for the Long-Short portfolio, as observations of fund characteristics are of less
importance in portfolio studies. After balancing the panel data with last observation carried forward and
omitting missing values, 1198 (net) and 1138(gross) funds remain. The process is further described in
subsection 4.3.5.
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following month. We calculate net returns as the monthly change in the NAV of each
individual fund. This process generates more observations of net returns than of gross
returns. We are not able to calculate the gross returns manually, we therefore use the
data provided by Morningstar Direct.
We utilize Morningstar Direct’s category search to limit our data. More specifically, we
exclude all non-equity funds i.e. bond funds, money market funds, real estate funds and
alternative funds. Furthermore, we exclude all funds that are index funds, according to
Morningstar Direct. This allows us to compare a sample of actively managed mutual
equity funds. To test for false positives not picked up by this categorization, we also
remove any funds that contain the word "index" and "indeks". Additionally, we remove
remaining funds that report an expense ratio that is below 0.1% per year, which active
funds are highly unlikely to have.
A common practice amongst the fund managing industry is to offer the same fund (in
terms of asset holdings) at different fee structures. If each subclass of a fund is treated as
separate entities, the statistical significance of effects from this fund would be artificially
increased (Berk and van Binsbergen, 2015). To avoid double-counting funds with multiple
share classes, we keep only one share class per fund. Funds with multiple share classes are
attributed with the aggregate fund family size. We choose to keep the share class with
the most observations within this fund, to retain the maximum age of the fund (Ľuboš
Pástor et al., 2015; Busse et al., 2013).
4.1.1 Collecting Risk Factors
To measure the abnormal returns of funds, we collect risk-factors that make up our four
benchmark models. We employ CAPM (Jensen, 1968), the Fama and French (1993)
three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model and Fama and French (2015b)
five-factor model. The model specifications are presented in subsection 5.1. As we are
mostly interested in the aggregate effect of the funds, and not each fund specifically, we
collect the international factors as provided from Kenneth French’s web cite5. This choice
is supported by the fact that the US mutual fund industry in total constitutes about 47%
of the global AUM (Investment Company Institute, 2021), and that most of our funds
5http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french
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invest globally. Statista Research Department (2021) reports that as of January 2021, the
US. stock market makes up almost 56% of the global equity market value, and that the
three largest European equity markets (UK, France and Germany) make up in total 8.6%.
With free capital flow across borders, and the observation that funds self-report what
benchmark they compare against6, we argue that use of global factors to be a reasonable
choice for making aggregate comparisons. Using fund fixed effects in the multivariate
analysis additionally strengthens the robustness of this choice, focusing more on the way
age affects the return within funds, not in a pooled manner.
4.2 Structure of Data Sample
Several recent papers covering similar topics have used a monthly periodicity, thus our
data sample contains monthly observations from January 2006 to February 2021. Most of
our variables are reported monthly by Morningstar Direct, which supports the monthly
periodicity, yielding higher robustness in our data set compared to annual data points.
4.3 Variables
In this section, we present the different variables that are used in our empirical methodology.
First, we describe our dependent variables, which are essential to answer our hypotheses.
We then present our main independent variable, followed by other fund-related control
variables that are included to mitigate the risk of omitted variable bias. Finally, we
present our descriptive statistics for the full data set, and a mean comparison between
the youngest and oldest age-quintiles in our sample. The latter is to supplement portfolio
analyses. Appendix A2.1 contains a detailed description of all the variables.
4.3.1 Dependent Variables
As suggested by Busse et al. (2013), we use both gross returns and returns net of fees, to
measure the difference in returns across fund age. Gross returns are the returns funds
achieve before any fee is deducted, while net returns are deducted these fund-specific fees.
According to Berk and van Binsbergen (2015), gross returns are better suited to assess the
6As a consequence, a fund’s investment objective may be conditioned to improve ex-post returns
ranking (Brown and Goetzmann, 1997).
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actual skill of a fund manager, while net returns are more informative for fund investors
as a measure of value added. By looking at both gross- and net returns, we can better
evaluate whether fees in a mutual fund implicate a difference in risk-adjusted returns,
risk-taking and investment style across fund age. In all of the measures that are presented
in the following section, x denotes whether the fund returns used are gross or net of fees.
To evaluate the risk-adjusted performance across fund age, we estimate four measures of
fund performance. These are estimated using a 12-month rolling window7. Specifically,
we estimate all the performance measures from t=1 to t=12, then from t=2 to t=13, t=3
to t=14 and so forth. Therefore, our first alpha is estimated at January of 2007, and we
lack by default any estimated alphas the first year of each fund’s life8.
The first performance measure we estimate is CAPMxi,t, which is fund i’s alpha at time
t from the CAPM one-factor model introduced by Jensen (1968). Second, we estimate
FF3FMxi,t, which is fund i’s alpha at time t from the Fama and French (1993) three-factor
model. Third, we estimate CARHARTxi,t, which is the alpha of fund i at time t from the
Carhart (1997) four-factor model. The last performance measure we estimate is FF5FMxi,t,
which is fund i’s alpha at time t from Fama and French (2015b) five-factor model.
To assess how risk-taking differs across fund age, we construct three different measures of
risk. All risk metrics (Riskxi,t) are estimated using the same 12-month rolling window. The
first risk measure FundRiskxi,t is given by fund i’s standard deviation in returns at time t.
SysRiskxi,t is measured as the estimated factor-loading on the market portfolio from CAPM
one-factor model for fund i’s at time t (otherwise presented as βMKT ). UnsysRiskxi,t is
the standard deviation of the residuals from the CAPM one-factor model for fund i at
time t 9.
Further, to assess the investment style of funds, we estimate the factor weightings MKTxi,t,
SMBxi,t (Small Minus Big), HMLxi,t (High Minus Low), RMWxi,t (Robust Minus Weak)
7Karoui and Meier (2009) use factors from months t=1 to t=24 (their rolling window) to estimate
alpha, however they mention that they are by construction determined in-sample.
8Estimating time-varying alphas in accordance with Huij and Verbeek (2009) demands sacrificing a
number of observations of data. The number of observations used to estimate is a decision that balances
two trade-offs: loss of data and the quality of the estimates(Sørensen, 2009). Our sample of data stretches
over a time period of 15 years, which constitutes at most 180 observations per fund. We consider the cost
of sacrificing observations to make our analysis vulnerable, hence we decide to use less than 10% of our
available observations to construct a rolling window, i.e. 12 months.
9Unsystematic risk is measured in accordance with the methodology of Chevalier and Ellison (1999b).
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and CMAxi,t (Conservative Minus Aggressive) from the Five-Factor Model of Fama and
French (2015b). We argue that the Five-Factor Model is the most relevant to answer our
hypothesis, as it is the most recent. These represent fund i’s loading on each risk factor
at time t. These are also estimated using a 12-month rolling window.
4.3.2 Main Independent Variable
Since this thesis investigates how fund age affects fund performance, we make FundAgei,t
our main independent variable. We calculate each fund’s age at each data point by
counting days since the inception date. This approach requires us to have an inception
date, which implies removing funds that do not report this attribute from the sample.
4.3.3 Control Variables
This section presents the different control variables related to fund characteristics that we
use in our analysis.
FundSizei,t is the size of each fund in each month reported in USD obtained from
Morningstar Direct. Top10Holdingsi,t is a measure of how many percent each fund’s
total assets the ten largest asset allocations constitute. The higher the percentage, the
less diversified is the fund. NumOfStocksi,t is the number of different stocks fund i holds
at time t, which also serves as a measure of diversification. ExpenseRatioi,t is reported
annually by Morningstar Direct, but we divide this ratio by 12 to make it fit our monthly
data. We argue that this linear approach is reasonable, as the expense ratio is usually
deducted and accrued on a daily basis. Turnoveri,t is the percentage of fund i’s stock
holdings that have changed over the past year. This may indicate how actively managed
a fund is.
In addition to our control variables, we want to control for time-, fund- and segment
fixed effects. We create time- and geographical dummies. We extract fixed effects to
isolate unobserved effects that might distort our results, such time variations, culture or
regulatory conditions. These time variations could be global economic shocks like the
financial crisis in 2007-2009. By including time dummies, we are able to isolate such
shocks in our analysis. Economic shocks affect some geographical areas more than others,
like the Euro crisis in 2011-2012. We capture these shocks with our segment dummies.
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Finally, we include fund-fixed effects in our regression to capture time-invariant effects
at the fund level. Fund-fixed effects are, however, captured through our panel regression
model. Following this, we argue that we are able to capture some of the unobserved effects
and isolate effects to have a more precise estimation of our regressions.
4.3.4 Winsorizing
Our variables contain several extreme values. We winsorize on a 1 percent level to avoid
skewing of our results due to outliers in our data sample 10. The variables we winsorize
are FundSizei,t, ExpenseRatioi,t, Top10Holdingsi,t, NumOfStocksi,t and Turnoveri,t.
4.3.5 Missing Values
Most of the data that we have obtained from Morningstar Direct is reported daily or
monthly. In some cases, we have odd or missing variable observations between periods
with continuously reported data. In other cases, we are missing all the data on specific
variables in a specific fund. Even if a common method is to omit missing values, Osbourne
(2013) argues that omission could lead to severe sample selection bias and inference errors.
To cope with missing values, we therefore use the method of "Last Observation Carried
Forward" for the variables FundSizei,t, ExpenseRatioi,t, Top10holdingsi,t, Turnoveri,t and
NumOfStocksi,t11. These variables are reported periodically, but we are missing data points
for some months. Inspecting for robustness, we find that this method gives us many more
observations, but does not skew the data when we run regressions. Our variables tend to
be fixed over periods of time, and e.g. expense ratio is not expected to change drastically
over time.
In the spirit of Elton et al. (2001), we exclude some of the lowest values. The presence of
low values may imply some form of measurement error. According to Evans (2010), low
fund sizes may also indicate that there is incubation bias present in the data set. Following
the methodology of Elton et al. (2001) and Chen et al. (2004), we remove observations
of the smallest funds. We remove funds with less than 2 MUSD in AUM, instead of 15
MUSD as suggested. This decision is supported by the fact that Nordic funds are smaller
on average, and that a cut-off of 15 MUSD reduces the data set severely, especially among
10Which may also help removing implausible values, as recommended by Rohleder et al. (2010).
11In accordance with Berk and van Binsbergen (2015).
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young funds. Further, we find it reasonable that a fund at least should report holdings of
more than one stock.
4.3.6 Descriptive Statistics
The final sample includes 110 173 (net) and 103 284 (gross) fund months. The total number
of funds is 1198 (net) and 1138 (gross). We present and compare the two samples in this
section. Table 4.1 reports summary statistics for the variables used in our regressions,
where Panel A represents observations with net returns and Panel B represents gross
returns. Table 4.2 reports the difference in means in these variables between the 1st
Quintile (youngest funds) and the 5th Quintile (oldest funds). We create quintiles rather
than firm age intervals to create subsamples with a similar number of observations, opposed
to Ľuboš Pástor et al. (2015)12. To further describe the two age-quintiles, we include a
visualization of the age distribution in figure 4.1.
Looking at table 4.1, we observe a positive average monthly net ExcessReturn of 0.393%
while the average monthly gross ExcessReturn is 0.687%13. Looking at the two samples’
mean FundAge, they are similar and approximately 13 years, and the top percentile p(99)
is 34 years old. Moreover, the average NumOfStocks held in a fund is 76 for the net
sample and 77 for the gross sample, yet it varies greatly in our sample. Some funds
p(1) hold only 13 stocks while other funds p(99) hold 541 stocks. The average FundSize
is 293 MUSD (net) and 283 MUSD (gross). The bottom percentile p(1) is a little less
than 3 MUSD, while the top percentile p(99) is 3200 MUSD. Furthermore, funds have
approximately 43% invested in their Top10Holdings. The average ExpenseRatio is 0.131%,
ranging from 0.028% to 0.276% per month. The average annual Turnover is 68% (Net)
and 67% (Gross)14. Looking at the percentiles, we observe variations from 0% to 374%
turnover per year.
To investigate fund portfolios based on age, we separate the data set into five groups
sorted by age. We are interested in the 1st and 5th quintiles, which include the returns of
12The split is somehow arbitrary, but serves the purpose to distinctly separate the groups, just as
Fama and French (2015b, p. 11) does with factors portfolios.
13By excess return, we refer to the actual returns achieved deducted the risk-free rate which is the
equivalent of a one-month T-bill rate.
14According to Ang (2014), the average turnover of active mutual funds in the US is between 80% and
90%, which is far higher than what we find in our sample.
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the 20% youngest and 20% oldest funds at each time, respectively15. Examining table 4.2
gives us some insight before our analysis. 1st Q. and 5th Q. show the mean values of the
different characteristics for the youngest and oldest funds, respectively, for both our Net
and Gross sample. The Difference column presents the difference between young and old
funds. These differences are tested in a two-sided t-test to see if they are significantly
different. The quintiles presented are expected to exhibit different properties16. This is,
however, simply a comparison of means between young and older funds, and is solely
used to gain presumptive insight into our data, not to draw any conclusions about causal
relationships determined by belonging to different age quintiles.
Firstly, we find that older funds have higher ExcessReturn in both samples. The comparison
also shows that younger funds have on average 17 fewer stocks. When comparing FundSize,
we find that older funds are on average approximately three times larger than their youngest
peers. Turnover significantly differs between the two groups, where younger funds turnover
75% of their portfolio and older funds only 60%, indicating that funds are more actively
managed when young. Older funds’ holdings are also slightly more concentrated in
their Top10Holdings, indicating higher risk-taking and more overconfidence by the fund’s
management. This could be caused by investor’s lower sensitivity to poor performance in
older funds, as described by Chevalier and Ellison (1997). Examining the means of the
different risk variables, we observe that the young funds take on more FundRisk (Gross)
and UnsysRisk (Net and Gross), while the old funds take on more SysRisk (Net and
Gross). We find that younger funds on average load more on all the risk factors (Gross).
On the other hand, older funds seem to have higher alpha when considering CAPM and
FF3FM (Gross). The difference between the remaining variables are not statistically
significant at a 5% significance level.
15The top and bottom quintile is later used to construct the Long-Short portfolio presented in subsection
5.4.1, and in the study of persistence within these quintiles in subsection 5.4.2.
16Graphical representations of how our control variables vary across fund age is presented in Appendix
A1.1
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Net Returns
Panel A: Net Obs Mean Std p(1) p(99)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ExcessReturni,t 110173 0.393 6.668 -19.759 17.0196
FundAgei,t (in years) 110173 12.9 7.982 1.273 34.366
NumOfStocksi,t 110173 76.423 115.314 13 541.955
FundSizei,t(in millions) 110173 293.636 566.223 2.896 3212.393
Top10Holdingsi,t 110173 42.83 15.817 11.49 99.392
ExpenseRatioi,t (per month) 110173 0.131 0.049 0.033 0.276
Turnoveri,t 110173 68.312 72.68 0 374
FundRiski,t 110173 5.911 2.832 1.809 15.093
SysRiski,t 110173 1.008 0.485 -0.638 2.056
UnsysRiski,t 110173 3.482 1.781 0.808 9.628
MKTni,t 110173 1.001 0.645 -0.989 2.608
SMBni,t 110173 -0.131 0.795 -2.292 2.045
HMLni,t 110173 -0.1 1.053 -3.007 3.028
RMWni,t 110173 -0.119 1.456 -4.583 3.745
CMAni,t 110173 -0.488 1.533 -5.562 2.746
CAPMni,t 110173 -0.404 1.357 -3.763 3.552
FF3FMni,t 110173 -0.537 1.554 -4.711 3.585
CARHARTni,t 110173 -0.496 1.557 -4.644 3.665
FF5FMni,t 110173 -0.523 1.825 -5.38 4.52
Panel B: Gross Obs Mean Std p(1) p(99)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ExcessReturni,t 103284 0.687 6.526 -18.949 17.212
FundAgei,t (in years) 103284 13.010 8.037 1.312 34.685
NumOfStocksi,t 103284 77.399 117.057 14 544.153
FundSizei,t(in millions) 103284 283.161 538.739 2.944 2815.299
Top10Holdingsi,t 103284 42.549 15.881 11.316 99.515
ExpenseRatioi,t (per month) 103284 0.131 0.048 0.028 0.276
Turnoveri,t 103284 67.588 72.684 0 374
FundRiski,t 103284 5.793 2.833 1.702 14.942
SysRiski,t 103284 1.006 0.465 -0.551 2.040
UnsysRiski,t 103284 3.308 1.718 0.720 9.351
MKTgi,t 103284 1.018 0.589 -0.692 2.579
SMBgi,t 103284 -0.152 0.729 -2.218 1.751
HMLgi,t 103284 -0.076 1.019 -2.884 3.015
RMWgi,t 103284 -0.087 1.368 -4.150 3.674
CMAgi,t 103284 -0.494 1.473 -5.445 2.573
CAPMgi,t 103284 -0.129 1.293 -3.262 3.766
FF3FMgi,t 103284 -0.249 1.436 -4.066 3.750
CARHARTgi,t 103284 -0.222 1.430 -3.935 3.779
FF5FMgi,t 103284 -0.258 1.753 -4.912 4.667
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for all variables in both the sample of net
returns (Panel A) and gross returns (Panel B)
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Table 4.2: Comparison of FundAge-Quintiles 1(young) and 5(old)
FundAge quintiles 1st Q. 5th Q. Difference 1st Q. 5th Q. Difference
(Net) (Net) (Net) (Gross) (Gross) (Gross)
ExcessReturni,t 0.351 0.462 -0.111* 0.621 0.760 -0.139**
FundAgei,t (in years) 3.296 24.654 -21.358*** 3.336 24.915 -21.579***
NumOfStocksi,t 71.191 87.959 -16.768*** 72.349 89.829 -17.480***
FundSizei,t(in millions) 157.222 491.065 -333.843*** 151.693 496.251 -344.558***
Top10Holdingsi,t 41.976 42.452 -0.476*** 41.477 42.209 -0.732***
ExpenseRatioi,t (per month) 0.138 0.125 0.013*** 0.139 0.125 0.014***
Turnoveri,t 74.631 60.353 14.278*** 76.139 59.789 16.35***
FundRiski,t 5.841 5.833 0.008 5.777 5.683 0.094***
SysRiski,t 0.989 1.028 -0.039*** 0.992 1.021 -0.029***
UnsysRiski,t 3.48 3.288 0.192*** 3.345 3.097 0.248***
MKTxi,t 0.99 1.014 -0.024*** 1.006 1.030 -0.024***
SMBxi,t -0.114 -0.128 0.014* -0.131 -0.155 0.024***
HMLxi,t -0.102 -0.135 0.033*** -0.074 -0.129 0.055***
RMWxi,t -0.132 -0.148 0.016 -0.071 -0.109 0.038***
CMAxi,t -0.487 -0.388 -0.099*** -0.513 -0.387 -0.126***
CAPMxi,t -0.38 -0.392 0.012 -0.130 -0.099 -0.031**
FF3FMxi,t -0.52 -0.534 0.014 -0.259 -0.231 -0.028**
CARHARTxi,t -0.481 -0.509 0.028* -0.235 -0.216 -0.019
FF5FMxi,t -0.519 -0.511 -0.008 -0.273 -0.241 -0.032*
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: This table compares the two age quintiles. Net and Gross returns are reported separately. The differences
between the young and old quintiles are t-tested.
Figure 4.1: Age Distribution of 1st. and 5th. Age Quintile
Note: This figure showcase the age-distribution within our two age quintiles of choice.
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4.4.1 Survivorship bias
Survivorship bias arises when we exclude returns of funds that are no longer alive. Not
only is the fund management industry and the number of funds growing, according to
Horst et al. (2001) the relative number of funds that close or merge also increase. The
bias is of high importance in performance studies. Malkiel (1995) finds that by controlling
for survivorship bias in his data set covering 1982 to 1990, the average annual return
decreases by 1.4%. Rohleder et al. (2010) notes that during the period between 1993 and
2006, the US domestic equity funds achieve an annual 14 basis point positive alpha if not
taking into account the closed funds, while an unbiased data set achieves an annual 95
basis point negative alpha. Attrition of closed funds leads to an overestimation of fund
performance, which is shown by the significant negative effect that including them has
on the overall alpha. Funds are found to be more likely to die in their younger years
(Chevalier and Ellison, 1999b).
Even with a complete database of all funds that have existed in the time period of interest,
survivorship bias may inhibit fund performance studies. One source that may bias the
results is rules proposed in the data cleaning process. Timmermann et al. (2006) require
at least 60 months of returns even to include the fund in their final data set. This data
selection rule is one of the issues that Fama and French (2010) addresses when comparing
their results to the findings of Timmermann et al. (2006). In our data set, we do not
exclude funds based on their number of observations. The attempt we make to find
evidence of differences in performance between young and old funds does not coinciding
with removing all funds younger than five years. This group of funds make out the full
"young" quintile that we have formed, as seen in figure 4.1.
Our data set is also subject to selection bias based on data-availability. We lose observations
in the process of adding variables to our model. More young funds seem to not report
data on e.g. FundSize. Our conclusions from our performance analysis is thereby biased
by what data we are able to gather.
28 4.4 Potential Sources of Bias in the Data Sample
4.4.2 Incubation Bias
Incubation bias occurs on instances where fund managers incubate a handful of funds,
but do not yet publicly trade them. Those who perform well within a certain time
period will be publicly available, while those who do not are closed. Incubation bias is
therefore a form of selection bias that complete data set itself may be subject to. Funds
in incubation are found to have nearly 10% higher returns than non-incubated funds
(Evans, 2010). This outperformance is however temporary, as Evans (2010) also finds
that by removing the first 3 years of records, he could mitigate 95 percent of the present
incubation bias. As there are no studies on the existence of incubation bias in Nordic
countries to our knowledge, we personally contacted The Norwegian Financial Supervisory
Authority (Personal communication, 30.04.2021) to find if we should take this bias into
account. NFSA responds that the rules covering Norwegian funds prohibit this practice.
We therefore believe our data not to be strongly affected by incubation bias. Attempting
to resort the potential of incubation bias, we still remove all observations where FundAgei,t
is less than 2 MUSD, as the funds will not be large during incubation (Evans, 2010). In
addition, we avoid estimating in-sample alphas during the first year, unlike what Karoui
and Meier (2009) do.
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5 Methodology
This section aims to describe the econometric methods applied in this thesis. To assess
the objective of our thesis, we first define what constitutes performance by creating a
benchmark. We then present our multivariate regression models that we use to investigate
how fund age affects risk-adjusted performance, risk-propensity and investment style.
Lastly, we present the setup of our long-short portfolio, and our two approaches to
investigate persistence.
5.1 The Performance of Mutual Funds Across Fund
Age
There are various performance measures to evaluate risk-adjusted returns of mutual funds.
In this paper, we evaluate the performance of mutual funds based on fund age using four
different performance measures. These models are presented below.
5.1.1 CAPM
The Capital Asset Pricing Model, known as CAPM, was developed by Treynor (1961),
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966), and later put to use as a performance
measure by Jensen (1968). The CAPM introduces a relationship between risk exposure
and expected return, that in aggregate an asset’s covariance with the market is the only
risk that explain returns as unsystematic risks are diversified away. The model measures
returns generated by a fund after adjusting for market risk. We can use this to evaluate
fund performances. The model is defined as
Rxi,t −Rf,t = αi + βi(Rm,t −Rf,t) + εi,t , (5.1)
where Rxi,t is the return of a fund in period t, where x denotes whether gross(g) or net(n)
returns are used. Rf,t is the risk-free rate at time t and Rm,t is the return on the market
portfolio at time t.
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βi is fund i ’s exposure to market risk (non diversifiable risk) in the market portfolio. εi,t is
the error term which has an expectation of zero17 and measures unsystematic risk that is
not explained by the model. The alpha αi is the abnormal return of the fund i at time t, in
excess of the market portfolio. A positive alpha indicates that the fund is outperforming
the market portfolio, while a negative alpha indicates underperformance.
5.1.2 FF3FM
Several papers argue that there are other relevant risk factors that explain cross-sectional
asset returns than market risk (Basu, 1983; Rosenberg et al., 1985). In the Three-Factor
Model, Fama and French (1993) include two additional risk factors, the size (SMB) and
value (HML) premiums.
Rxi,t −Rf,t = αi + β1i(Rm,t −Rf,t) + β2iSMBt + β3iHMLt + εi,t (5.2)
Small Minus Big (SMB) is constructed as the difference in returns between the smallest
and largest firms in terms of market capitalization. It represents the excess return that
smaller market capitalization companies return versus larger companies. High Minus Low
(HML) is constructed as the difference in returns between the high and low book-to-market
firms. The factor represents value stocks outperforming growth stocks. β1, β2 and β3 are
fund i ’s estimated exposure to the risk-factors. αi is the abnormal returns and εi,t is the
unsystematic risk for fund i at time t.
5.1.3 Carharts 4-factor Model
Motivated by discovering that the Fama and French 3-factor model is unable to explain
cross-sectional variation in momentum-sorted portfolio returns, Carhart (1997) added
a momentum factor originally proposed by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). This factor
captures the one-year momentum anomaly that was discovered to be robust over time
and countries despite implying some market inefficiency (Carhart, 1997). Despite the
unpredictable nature of individual stocks’ performance, a portfolio of past winners
17An assumption necessary to estimate unbiased coefficients in an OLS-regression (Wooldridge, 2009).
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outperforms a portfolio of past losers18.
The momentum factor Up minus Down (UMD) reflects the return of a portfolio of stocks
that performed well in the recent past in excess of the return on a portfolio of stocks that
performed badly in the recent past. The Carhart 4-Factor model is specified as follows:
Rxi,t −Rf,t = αi + β1i(Rm,t −Rf,t) + β2iSMBt + β3iHMLt + β4iUMDt + εi,t (5.3)
β1, β2, β3 and β4 represents fund i ’s corresponding exposure to each of the risk-factors. αi
is the abnormal returns and εi,t is the unsystematic risk for fund i at time t.
5.1.4 FF5FM
During the last decades, the models mentioned above have become synonymous with
performance evaluation. Following its broad and frequent use in both academia and
by professionals, certain anomalies have been observed to manifest themselves in the
market19.
Fama and French address this issue, and attempt to increase the fit of their model, by
introducing two additional factors (Fama and French, 2015b). Companies with robust
profitability tend to achiever higher stock returns, which is the rationale behind the factor
RMW (robust minus weak). The last factor is related to the rate that the companies
invest to grow, CMA (conservative minus aggressive). The RMW factor is therefore
constructed as the return of a portfolio of stocks with robust profitability in excess of the
return on a portfolio of stocks with weak profitability. The CMA factor is constructed
as the return of a portfolio of stocks of low investment firms (conservative) in excess of
the return on a portfolio of stocks with high investment (aggressive). The Fama French
5-Factor Model is specified as follows:
Rxi,t−Rf,t = αi+β1i(Rm,t−Rf,t)+β2iSMBt+β3iHMLt+β4iRMWt+β5iCMAt+εi,t (5.4)
18Over a time period of 5 years, however, this effect is found to be either eliminated, or even reversed.
This is usually referred to as mean reversal (Bondt and Thaler, 1985).
19One of which is the beta anomaly, which suggests that low-beta stocks have been performing better
than what the market model predicts. Common explanations cover issues such as the increased volume
of investment flows into index funds and ETF’s, as well as a tendency for investors to instead invest in
high beta stocks than place a leveraged position in low-beta stocks. The relative price of those low-beta
stocks fall, and therefore the expected return increase. These findings were made across many countries
(Frazzini and Pedersen, 2014). We address market beta exposure in subsection 6.3
32 5.1 The Performance of Mutual Funds Across Fund Age
β1, β2, β3, β4 and β5 represents the funds corresponding exposure to each of the risk-factors.
αi is the abnormal returns and εi,t is the unsystematic risk for fund i at time t.
5.1.5 Multivariate Regression
To account for fund-specific characteristics that vary across fund age, we construct a
multivariate regression:
Perfxi,t = β0 + β1FundAgei,t + β2FundSizei,t−1
+β3Top10Holdingsi,t−1 + β4NumOfStocksi,t−1
+β5ExpenseRatioit−1 + β6Turnoveri,t−1 + εi,t
(5.5)
Perfxi,t is the alpha of fund i at time t from one of four performance measures,
CAPMxi,t, FF3FMxi,t, CARHARTxi,t or FF5FMxi,t, as described previously in subsection
4.3.1. Performance is denoted with both i and t, as we are using rolling alphas). And
again, x denotes whether the regression is based on gross return or net return. By using
Perfxi,t as the dependent variable, we are able to control for fund characteristics that
might affect abnormal returns of a fund. The FundAgei,t variable is the main independent
variable and takes the age of fund i at time t to try to explain the alpha. If FundAgei,t
shows a positive (or negative) statistically significant sign, it could indicate that young
funds outperform (underperform) older funds in our sample.
The rest of our variables are control variables. We include the logarithm of FundSizei,t-1
and NumOfStocksi,t-120. In addition, all variables are lagged one month to avoid
spurious correlation and potential endogeniety problems, as discussed by Carhart (1997).
Furthermore we include geographical and time dummies to capture geographical and
time-specific effects. The control variables are of less interest for our research questions,
but they are included in the regression to mitigate some of the risk of omitted variable
bias.
Further, we assume that some funds will consistently perform at different levels. To
account for and avoid autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the error term related to
entity effects, we perform the regression with fund fixed effects and cluster our standard
20The distribution of these variables is left-skewed, and to accommodate this non-normality, we
log-transform FundSize and NumOfStocks.
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errors accordingly. In addition, fund size and fund age may propose endogeneity problems,
as skill may be correlated with both these fund characteristics as well as performance(Berk
and van Binsbergen, 2015). Ľuboš Pástor et al. (2015) and Berk and van Binsbergen
(2015) argue that since we cannot observe skill, fund fixed effects absorb the cross-sectional
variation that such omitted variable bias incur. Ultimately, fund fixed effects add to our
objective of finding how age affects fund performance, and not how funds of different ages
are distributed in our sample.
5.2 Risk-Taking of Mutual Funds Across Fund Age
Does fund age affect the level of risk funds take? To examine this, we run a multivariate
regression that controls for fund characteristics that might affect the risk-taking of a fund:
Riskxi,t = β0 + β1FundAgei,t + β2FundSizei,t−1
+β3Top10Holdingsi,t−1 + β4NumOfStocksi,t−1
+β5ExpenseRatioit−1 + β6Turnoveri,t−1 + εi,t
(5.6)
This regression resembles the multivariate regression from equation 5.5, but the dependent
variable is now Riskxi,t. We include the same independent variable and control variables as
in equation 5.5. Riskxi,t reflects one of three risk measures for fund i at time t, FundRiskxi,t,
SysRiskxi,t or UnsysRiskxi,t. Whether we are using gross or net returns is again denoted
by x. Our dependant variable is FundAgexi,t and a statistical significant regression output
would indicate that older funds take more or less risk than younger funds based on fund
risk, systematic risk or unsystematic risk.
5.3 Investment Style of Mutual Funds Across Fund Age
Does fund age affect the investment style of mutual funds? We regress a funds Factor-
Weightings on fund age and other fund characteristics.
FactorWeightxi,t = β0 + β1FundAgei,t + β2FundSizei,t−1
+β3Top10Holdingsi,t−1 + β4NumOfStocksi,t−1
+β5ExpenseRatioit−1 + β6Turnoveri,t−1 + εi,t
(5.7)
34 5.4 Investment Strategies Based on Age
Where FactorWeightxi,t represents either SMBxi,t, HMLxi,t, UMDxi,t, RMWxi,t or CMAxi,t for
fund i, at time t. Again, x denotes whether we use gross or net returns. The main
independent variable is still FundAgexi,t. Whether FundAgexi,t has a positive or negative
coefficient, indicates that age affects the investment style of funds. The same control
variable from previous regressions 5.5 and 5.6 are applied.
5.4 Investment Strategies Based on Age
5.4.1 Long-Short Portfolio
To further test if young funds and older funds perform differently on a risk-adjusted basis,
we create both an equal-weighted and a value-weighted portfolio. The equal-weighted
portfolio is constructed by dividing the funds into five, monthly rebalanced, age quintiles
(following Busse et al. (2013) and Ľuboš Pástor et al. (2015)). Fund returns in each
specified month are given the same weight, for the top quintile and bottom quintile,
respectively. This is then used to construct a hypothetical portfolio that is long in young
funds and short in old funds21. The difference (Young - Old) is regressed on the one-,
three-, four- and five-factor model. This allows us to interpret the alpha in the model,
and evaluate whether risk-adjusted performance differs between young and old funds.
We repeat the process, but with returns that are weighted by the relative FundSize of each
fund. According to Rohleder et al. (2010), the smaller non-surviving funds are affecting
the measured performance downwards. Hence, a value-weighted portfolio is assumed to
limit survivorship bias.
To create a value-weighted portfolio, we weight the funds according to their relative






To test whether performance persists, and therefore investigate signs of fund managers’
ability to outperform the market consistently, we follow Carhart (1997) and employ two
21The zero-investment Long-Short-portfolio is hypothetical, as mutual fund investors cannot short sell
shares in Nordic funds. It does however more clearly highlight performance differences.
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methods - the recursive portfolio approach and contingency tables. With the investor in
mind, we employ the model using net returns. In January of each year, we sort funds
into five equal-weighted quintile portfolios based on their lagged one-year returns22. The
portfolios are ranked from losers to winners, i.e. portfolio 1 consists of the worst performing
the prior year, and portfolio 5 consists of the best performing funds. The following year
serves to evaluate whether the performance persists, however, the two methods differ in
how this is executed which is described in the next sections. Our method deviates from
others as we are sorting and evaluating within a sub-sample, namely the two age-quintiles
in question.
5.4.2.1 Recursive Portfolio Approach
The Recursive Portfolio Approach is common in persistence studies and includes a
hypothesis test of whether the portfolio formed on lagged returns outperforms the
benchmark (Hendricks et al., 1993; Grinblatt and Titman, 1992; Carhart, 1997). As it
has been found that the UMD factor explains most of the abnormal returns in persistence
studies, we choose to not reward fund managers for exposure to this systematic anomaly
by employing the 4-factor model of Carhart (1997). Following Vidal-García (2013), we use
annual intervals with the argument of removing the chance of losing signals of superior
performance to random noise. Persistence can be measured across different intervals of
time. We argue that any time period longer than one year will limit our observations
strongly in the young quintile. Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) use a minimum of 6
months of observations in their estimation window to test persistency. As a consequence,
we argue that testing for one-year persistence fits the purpose of our thesis.
We form equally-weighted portfolios based on performance ranking in one period, and then
evaluate the performance of these portfolios’ monthly returns over the subsequent holding
period. The portfolio takes into account funds that are obsolete during the evaluation
period by redistributing the portfolio-weight of these funds equally to the remaining funds.
The same procedure goes for funds that transfer to a new age quintile. We argue that
this helps to mitigate survivorship bias23 in the evaluation period. The portfolios formed
22Sørensen (2009) argues that excluding funds that do not have 12 months of returns in the formation
period does not impose a survivorship bias, as investors are free to choose not to invest in funds lacking a
full year of historical returns
23In their study of biases in persistence studies, Horst et al. (2001) argues that if there is survivorship
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on lagged 1-year returns are then tested by employing Carhart (1997) 4-factor model
over the holding periods. If the portfolios that previously outperformed in the ranking
period continue to do so during the next holding period, there is evidence of performance
persistence. Further, we create a hypothetical equal-weighted portfolio which is long past
winners and short past losers (Q5-Q1), to highlight differences between the two portfolios.
We do not evaluate funds that change age-quintiles during the ranking period, as the
strategy is only to hold the youngest funds.
5.4.2.2 Contingency Table
To further analyze how performance persists, we perform two consecutive performance
sorts to understand further how each portfolio behave in the evaluation (subsequent)
period. The use of contingency tables is of value as we want to understand how likely it
is for each performance portfolio to stay in the same rank, as well as to understand the
likelihood that funds either die or transfer to a new age quintile.
As with the recursive portfolio approach, we keep the data set divided into the 1st. and
5th. age-quintile to compare the persistence within these groups. The initial ranking
is equal to the one employed in the recursive portfolio approach. The consecutive year
we perform a similar ranking process but do, however, also categorize observations that
do not have a full year of returns into two additional groups. The old quintile is only
subject to being closed or merged (obsolete) during the evaluation period. All observations
missing annual returns are categorized as "Dead", as they died during the evaluation
period. Conversely, the young portfolio is also subject to missing values caused by funds
transferring to the next age-quintile. We categorize those funds that do not have an
obsolete day during the evaluation year as "Change to 2nd Q".




This section presents our empirical results. First, we present results from our multivariate
analysis, where we compare our findings to previous research. We then examine the
differences in risk-taking and investment styles of young and old funds. Furthermore, we
investigate how a portfolio that is long in young funds and short in old funds performs
against the four benchmark models presented in section 5.1. Finally, we investigate
whether the performance of portfolios formed on fund age persists.
6.1 Does Fund Age Affect The Performance of Mutual
Funds?
We run the regression presented as equation 5.5 to investigate how fund age affects
performance. In this analysis, we run panel regressions of our risk-adjusted returns on
different fund characteristics. The results are presented in table 6.1.
The main independent variable FundAgei,t is displaying the relationship between fund age
and performance, after controlling for variables we believe capture much of the variance
otherwise picked up by FundAgei,t. While studies of mutual funds in the US. often find
that performance deteriorates as funds becomes older (Webster, 2002; Ľuboš Pástor et al.,
2015), we find the opposite in our sample. We find that the FundAgei,t coefficient is
positive (in all specifications except CAPM on net returns), and significantly so, indicating
better performance among older funds. In Panel A we find that by increasing FundAgei,t
by 1 year, Perfxi,t increases in the range of 4.7 to 8.8 basis points, while in Panel B we find
an increase ranging between 1.1 and 9.8 basis points. The economic effect of FundAgei,t
on Perfxi,t is slightly stronger in the gross returns sample.
Further, we observe that the slope of FundSizei,t is positive, which suggests that larger
funds perform better. This contradicts findings by other studies (Chen et al., 2004; Ľuboš
Pástor et al., 2015). Graham et al. (2019), who compared the US and Europe, did however
find that the decreasing returns to scale is not present outside of the US. The cross country
study of Ferreira et al. (2013) support these findings, and argue that the deviation is
caused by differing exposure towards small-cap funds, and the related liquidity premium.
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The positive coefficient of expense ratio is not expected, especially considering figure A2.2
in the Appendix which demonstrate that young funds that die have significantly higher
fees compared to those who survive.
Carhart (1997) claimed turnover to be a determinant to lower returns, as the activity of
buying and selling assets incur higher costs. Our regression output does not coincide with
his observation. On the contrary, the overall tendency is a positive effect, however, the
results are not significant on a 5% significance level. As we have found previously, Nordic
mutual funds have on average a lower turnover rate than US funds. This may indicate
that while turnover is costly, fund managers are able to regain the costs by higher returns.
Table 6.1: Multivariate Regression
Panel A: Net Panel B: Gross
CAPMi,t FF3FMi,t CARHARTi,t FF5FMi,t CAPMi,t FF3FMi,t CARHARTi,t FF5FMi,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FundAgei,t −0.001 0.088∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
t = −0.191 t = 15.949 t = 8.947 t = 12.253 t = 2.706 t = 21.583 t = 13.484 t = 16.997
FundSizei,t-1 0.327∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
t = 12.602 t = 8.509 t = 8.353 t = 6.992 t = 12.600 t = 8.467 t = 8.807 t = 5.841
Top10Holdingsi,t-1 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.004∗ −0.002 −0.005∗∗ −0.004∗∗ −0.002 −0.0001 −0.003
t = −2.615 t = −1.648 t = −0.801 t = −2.155 t = −2.280 t = −0.841 t = −0.028 t = −1.473
ExpenseRatioi,t-1 2.131∗∗∗ 2.400∗∗∗ 2.261∗∗∗ 2.557∗∗ 2.434∗∗∗ 2.656∗∗∗ 2.612∗∗∗ 2.848∗∗
t = 3.060 t = 2.714 t = 2.911 t = 2.527 t = 2.925 t = 2.588 t = 2.930 t = 2.322
NumOfStocksi,t-1 −0.075∗∗ 0.031 0.031 0.027 −0.042 0.068∗ 0.065∗ 0.079∗
t = −2.104 t = 0.744 t = 0.808 t = 0.617 t = −1.268 t = 1.871 t = 1.930 t = 1.934
Turnoveri,t-1 0.0002 0.001∗ 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.001∗ 0.0001 0.0003
t = 0.819 t = 1.858 t = 0.726 t = 0.998 t = 1.258 t = 1.768 t = 0.513 t = 0.906
Time Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Segment Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 109,384 109,384 109,384 109,384 102,675 102,675 102,675 102,675
R2 0.083 0.068 0.025 0.041 0.093 0.093 0.028 0.051
Adjusted R2 0.073 0.058 0.014 0.030 0.083 0.082 0.017 0.040
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: This table presents a regression of Perfxi,t as the dependent variable, where x denotes either CAPMi,t, FF3FMi,t, CARHARTi,t or FF5FMi,t.
The dependent variable is the alpha estimated with a rolling regression with our four performance measures at each time t for each fund i. The
regressions are estimated with the use of time, segment and fund fixed effects. All variables are defined according to the detailed description in
Appendix A2.1. Panel A and Panel B displays estimations constructed with Net and Gross returns, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at
the fund level.
6.2 Does Fund Age Affect Risk-Taking of Mutual
Funds?
In the previous section, we found indications of fund age affecting performance. In the
following section, we test the hypothesis that risk-taking varies across age. Table 6.2
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reports our results. We find that an increased age leads to less risk-taking on all of our
risk metrics. Our findings support Karoui and Meier (2009), who find that young funds
exhibit higher total and unsystematic risk. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) report the same
relationship between fund age and risk-taking, which is argued to be caused by a stronger
incentive in younger funds to take risk at the end of the year if they have performed
poorly.
A reduction of risk as a fund ages is often related to diversification benefits as the fund
becomes larger in size. Karoui and Meier (2009) finds that the number of different stocks
typically increases drastically the first year or two after inception. In our sample, we
do not find this behaviour to be true, as we display in Appendix A1.1. Our sample do
however support that an increased FundSizei,t reduce overall risk of the fund.
The positive (and sometimes significant) relationship between expense ratio and risk can
indicate that higher management costs are related to more active management.
As expected, and in line with the theory of diversification, holding more stocks decreases
the unsystematic risk of funds.
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Table 6.2: Risk-Taking Multivariate Regression
Panel A: Net Panel B: Gross
FundRiski,t SysRiski,t UnsysRiski,t FundRiski,t SysRiski,t UnsysRiski,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FundAgei,t −0.046∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.067∗∗∗
t = −5.104 t = −28.681 t = −5.518 t = −10.085 t = −30.836 t = −15.330
FundSizei,t-1 −0.541∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.223∗∗∗ −0.438∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗
t = −10.504 t = −3.886 t = −5.933 t = −9.493 t = −2.892 t = −5.474
Top10Holdingsi,t-1 0.003 −0.0003 0.002 0.005 0.00002 0.003
t = 0.512 t = −0.314 t = 0.982 t = 1.088 t = 0.019 t = 1.590
ExpenseRatioi,t-1 2.724∗∗ 0.157 1.693∗∗∗ 1.717 0.239 0.844
t = 2.497 t = 0.928 t = 2.601 t = 1.453 t = 1.230 t = 1.392
NumOfStocksi,t-1 0.383∗∗∗ 0.005 −0.081 0.369∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.118∗∗∗
t = 3.777 t = 0.383 t = −1.408 t = 3.770 t = 0.078 t = −2.631
Turnoveri,t-1 0.001∗∗ 0.0001 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.0001 0.001∗∗
t = 2.276 t = 1.123 t = 2.404 t = 1.901 t = 1.045 t = 1.987
Time Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Segment Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 109,384 109,384 109,384 102,675 102,675 102,675
R2 0.222 0.116 0.252 0.251 0.142 0.318
Adjusted R2 0.213 0.106 0.244 0.243 0.132 0.310
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: This table presents a regression of Riskxi,t as the dependent variable, where x denotes either FundRiski,t,
SysRiski,t or UnsysRiski,t. FundRiski,t captures the total risk of each fund, measured by its standard deviation at
time t over the 12-month rolling window estimation. SysRiski,t is the systematic risk measured by fund i ’s loading on
the market factor from the CAPM-model at time t.UnsysRiski,t is the unsystematic risk measured by the standard
deviation of residuals from the CAPM-model at time t for each fund i. The regressions are estimated with the use of
time, segment and fund fixed effects. All variables are defined according to the detailed description in Appendix A2.1.
Panel A and Panel B displays estimations constructed with Net and Gross returns, respectively. Standard errors are
clustered at the fund level.
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6.3 Does Investment Styles Differ Across Fund Age?
This section investigates whether age affects the investment styles of mutual funds. The
investment styles can be distinguished by each funds loading on the different risk factors.
The analysis is performed using rolling betas estimated with the five-factor model of
(Fama and French, 2015b). We regress the rolling factor-loadings by fund characteristics,
and are able to observe how FundAgei,t affects each loading. The regression output is
presented in Table 6.3
Our findings suggest that as funds get older they are likely to be less exposed to the overall
market risk, and instead utilize other strategies. The results are indifferent to the net- or
gross return samples. FundAgei,t significantly affects MKTi,t negatively and significantly
positive for all the other factors. Our findings support Chevalier and Ellison (1999b), who
argues that younger funds are more likely to avoid deviation from market benchmarks, as
investors in young funds are more sensitive to such deviations. Our findings do not support
Karoui and Meier (2009) who find young funds to invest more heavily in smaller and less
liquid stocks, which constitutes the SMB-factor. A possible argument that supports this
is that Nordic funds are relatively small compared to US funds, and are as a consequence
not subject to the same magnitude of transaction costs that large funds incur, especially
in less lliquid assets24.
24Which several papers have found to be the strongest explanation for the decreasing returns to scale
(Chen et al., 2004; Yan, 2008; Busse et al., 2013).
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6.4 Investment strategies
Thus far, we have investigated how fund age is affecting the performance, risk-taking
and investment styles. This section examines if an investor can take advantage of these
differences in performance by investing in different age portfolios.
6.4.1 Long-Short portfolio
To investigate performance differences, we first study the behaviour of our long short
portfolio. We employ our four different performance measures on both Equal-Weighted
and Value-Weighted portfolios. Looking at Table 6.4, Panel A represents our results from
net returns, while Panel B represents gross returns.
Observing Panel A, we find the long-short portfolio to outperform, however, the results
are not significant. The Equal-Weighted portfolio achieves an alpha that ranges from 5.3
to 6.2 basis points, while the Value-Weighted portfolio achieves an alpha ranging between
6.0 and 7.5 basis points per month. There is an economically small increase in coefficient
values as we adjust to the value-weighted portfolio, which may indicate that by giving
less weight to the smallest small funds the outperformance is more distinct25.
Panel B instead does not portray the same image. The factor weightings are comparable
with that of Panel A, but the alpha of the portfolio is small and alternating between
positive and negative values. More specifically, the value-weighted portfolio is the only
one that achieves a positive alpha, however it is not significantly different from zero.
Combined, this approach does not yield any significantly better performance in young
funds compared to old. The value-weighted portfolio in Panel B has a positive coefficient
for the HML factor and a negative coefficient for CMA.
To further inspect the portfolio, we display how it performs during our time-horizon in
figure 6.1, constructed with an equal-weighted portfolio based on the net return sample.
Most observations are within the range of one percent return per month, either negative
or positive.
25This finding is supported by Rohleder et al. (2010), suggesting that funds performing poorly shrink
in size before they die.
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Figure 6.1: Long-Short Portfolio Performance Over Time
Note: This figure presents monthly returns of the long-short portfolio over the samples’ time horizon.
The data points are constructed with the net return sample and an equal-weighted portfolio.
Lacking a significant alpha in our portfolio make us reject the null hypothesis that a
portfolio that is long in young funds and short in old funds achieves risk-adjusted returns,
but it does however direct us toward two interpretations. First, our analysis indicate that
the performance of our long-short portfolio is better when considering returns that are net
of fees. One possible explanation for this is that the youngest funds charge lower fees26.
However, this does not fit well with our observations in figure A1.1 in the Appendix. The
results are, however, not significant. Secondly, we observe that in both cases, the value-
weighted portfolio performs better. This observation follows the arguments of Chevalier
and Ellison (1997), that younger funds are more susceptible to dissolution, caused by the
higher sensitivity of outflows when performing poorly.
26Ľuboš Pástor et al. (2015) finds smaller differences when measuring with net returns, and suggests
that younger funds charge higher fees to capture a portion of their higher skill.
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Table 6.4: Long Short Portfolio

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Alphat 0.062 0.053 0.053 0.056 0.060 0.075 0.074 0.068
t = 1.362 t = 1.132 t = 1.138 t = 1.176 t = 0.844 t = 1.032 t = 1.017 t = 0.911
MKTt −0.038∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗
t = −3.777 t = −2.917 t = −2.971 t = −3.011 t = −4.080 t = −3.794 t = −3.297 t = −3.717
SMBt −0.009 −0.009 −0.006 −0.014 −0.012 −0.002
t = −0.427 t = −0.456 t = −0.279 t = −0.442 t = −0.375 t = −0.059
HMLt −0.017 −0.021 −0.005 0.033 0.048 0.051
t = −0.978 t = −1.138 t = −0.231 t = 1.221 t = 1.648 t = 1.620
UMDt −0.007 0.024
t = −0.619 t = 1.362
CMAt −0.042 −0.064
t = −1.159 t = −1.136
RMWt 0.014 0.066
t = 0.466 t = 1.393
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180
R2 0.074 0.082 0.084 0.090 0.086 0.093 0.103 0.110
Adjusted R2 0.069 0.066 0.063 0.064 0.080 0.078 0.082 0.084

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Alphat −0.017 −0.024 −0.024 −0.019 −0.009 0.009 0.008 0.011
t = −0.379 t = −0.515 t = −0.507 t = −0.394 t = −0.131 t = 0.123 t = 0.104 t = 0.144
MKTt −0.022∗∗ −0.018 −0.020∗ −0.021∗ −0.047∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗
t = −2.170 t = −1.598 t = −1.683 t = −1.818 t = −3.005 t = −2.947 t = −2.448 t = −3.191
SMBt −0.007 −0.008 −0.004 −0.011 −0.008 0.003
t = −0.352 t = −0.378 t = −0.200 t = −0.340 t = −0.268 t = 0.088
HMLt −0.012 −0.015 0.003 0.039 0.056∗ 0.075∗∗
t = −0.665 t = −0.821 t = 0.165 t = 1.453 t = 1.914 t = 2.388
UMDt −0.006 0.027
t = −0.547 t = 1.490
CMAt −0.051 −0.122∗∗
t = −1.408 t = −2.200
RMWt 0.015 0.073
t = 0.481 t = 1.546
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180
R2 0.026 0.030 0.032 0.042 0.048 0.060 0.071 0.097
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.013 0.009 0.014 0.043 0.044 0.050 0.071
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: This table presents a regression of an equal- and value-weighted portfolio that is long in young funds and short in old funds (y-o). The
portfolio returns are used as the dependent variable. Alphat represents the abnormal returns of the long-short strategy. Panel A and Panel B
displays estimations constructed with Net and Gross returns, respectively. Each panel displays results of portfolios formed on Equal-Weighted
and Value-Weighted returns separately.
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6.4.2 Persistence
So far, our analysis does not yield any clear indications for investors in terms of investment
decisions. We have found the young portfolio to slightly, but not significantly, outperform
the old portfolio. To investigate whether the performance that our age quintiles in question
display is not a result of luck and high risk-taking, we test for persistence.
We measure the performance persistence of portfolios that are ranked on lagged one-year
returns. We analyze persistence within the young and old quintiles to capture how these
groups behave separately, with two complementary approaches; the Recursive Portfolio
Approach and Contingency tables.
6.4.3 Recursive Portfolio Approach
First, we assess the young quintile. The regression output presented in table 6.5 implies that
none of the portfolios outperform the four-factor model of Carhart (1997), as all portfolios
display significantly negative coefficients. In our sample, we argue that persistence does not
necessitate a positive alpha for previous top-performers27, but they should at least perform
better than the other quintiles. Our findings indicate the opposite. The 5th quintile,
which is formed on the prior top -erformers, does not show evidence of better performance
compared to the other quintiles. Conversely, it seems to show worse performance than
most other quintiles, only slightly outperforming 4th Q. The same is found for the old
quintile, i.e. no evidence of persistence in either age quintiles. Model 6, which is a portfolio
long in past winners and short in past losers, support our evidence of persistence. The
young quintile (Panel A) indicates that the long-short strategy returns a negative 17.1
basis points alpha per month, which is not significant. The same result is found in the old
quintile (Panel B), however a somewhat smaller economic effect of only a negative 8.6
basis points alpha per month.
27While a sample of domestic funds and a benchmark created on domestic stocks, this argument does
not hold if some funds are found to outperform in the ranking period
6.4 Investment strategies 47
Table 6.5: Persistency
Panel A: Young quintile
1st Q 2nd Q 3rd Q 4th Q 5th Q 5th-1st Q
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Alphat −0.865∗∗∗ −0.519∗∗ −0.954∗∗∗ −1.110∗∗∗ −1.036∗∗∗ −0.171
t = −3.226 t = −2.519 t = −3.717 t = −3.977 t = −4.297 t = −0.638
MKTt 1.038∗∗∗ 0.989∗∗∗ 1.178∗∗∗ 1.257∗∗∗ 1.237∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
t = 16.361 t = 20.289 t = 19.399 t = 19.038 t = 21.680 t = 3.130
SMBt −0.104 −0.044 −0.170 −0.195 −0.215∗∗ −0.111
t = −0.898 t = −0.492 t = −1.537 t = −1.626 t = −2.072 t = −0.965
HMLt −0.174∗ −0.116 −0.224∗∗ −0.295∗∗∗ −0.219∗∗ −0.045
t = −1.693 t = −1.469 t = −2.270 t = −2.755 t = −2.366 t = −0.435
UMDt −0.399∗∗∗ −0.200∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗ −0.146∗∗ −0.062 0.338∗∗∗
t = −6.264 t = −4.089 t = −2.167 t = −2.207 t = −1.076 t = 5.298
Observations 156 156 156 156 156 156
R2 0.763 0.809 0.768 0.759 0.795 0.210
Adjusted R2 0.756 0.804 0.762 0.753 0.790 0.189
Panel B: Old quintile
1st Q 2nd Q 3rd Q 4th Q 5th Q 5th-1st Q
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Alphat −0.699∗∗∗ −0.558∗∗∗ −0.696∗∗∗ −0.786∗∗∗ −0.785∗∗∗ −0.086
t = −2.918 t = −2.710 t = −3.185 t = −3.180 t = −3.296 t = −0.417
MKTt 1.110∗∗∗ 1.091∗∗∗ 1.183∗∗∗ 1.224∗∗∗ 1.222∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗
t = 19.584 t = 22.403 t = 22.880 t = 20.926 t = 21.687 t = 2.299
SMBt −0.098 −0.121 −0.116 −0.099 −0.113 −0.015
t = −0.951 t = −1.360 t = −1.230 t = −0.928 t = −1.102 t = −0.169
HMLt −0.146 −0.168∗∗ −0.201∗∗ −0.277∗∗∗ −0.277∗∗∗ −0.131
t = −1.591 t = −2.132 t = −2.395 t = −2.916 t = −3.030 t = −1.650
UMDt −0.277∗∗∗ −0.241∗∗∗ −0.168∗∗∗ −0.099∗ 0.009 0.286∗∗∗
t = −4.860 t = −4.923 t = −3.241 t = −1.686 t = 0.159 t = 5.823
Observations 156 156 156 156 156 156
R2 0.802 0.835 0.829 0.792 0.792 0.268
Adjusted R2 0.796 0.830 0.825 0.787 0.786 0.249
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: This table presents a regression of Rxi,t - Rf,t (excess return) as the dependent variable, where
x denotes the portfolio of which is benchmarked. Models (1)-(5) are regressions of portfolios formed
on sorted lagged one-year returns, while model (6) is a hypothetical long-short portfolio going long
in previous winners and short in previous losers. CARHARTi,t is the alpha we measure, according to
formula 5.3. The regressions are estimated with the use of time, segment and fund fixed effects. All
variables are defined according to the detailed description in Appendix A2.1. Panel A and Panel B
displays estimations constructed with Net and Gross returns, respectively.
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6.4.4 Contingency Table
The contingency tables are presented below, the young portfolio in table 6.2 and the old
portfolio in table 6.3.
The graph measures Pr(Subsequent Ranking | Initial Ranking), i.e. the conditional
probability that funds from each of the initial sorts end up in either of the subsequent
ranking portfolios, becomes obsolete( or transfer to the next age-quintile28).
Figure 6.2: Persistence in The Young Quintile
Note: This figure presents how young funds behave in the period after their initial ranking. The z-axis
represents the conditional probability of funds being ranked in each subsequent performance quintile or
dies. This figure does not include funds that change from 1st to 2nd age-quintile during the evaluation
period, for the purpose of comparison. In the Appendix A1.2, the figure includes those funds that change
age-quintile.
About 25% of the young (1st age quintile) funds do, independent of its initial ranking,
transfer to the 2nd. age quintile during the subsequent holding period, and are therefore
not assigned a new rank. This transfer is expected, as the average age of funds in this
quintile is about 3 years29. For the purpose of comparing the young and old groups, we
only display observations of those who do not change age-quintile.
Observing the young funds in figure 6.2, we find that the worst and best performing funds
are highly likely to perform poorly the following year. However, the previously strong
performers do, almost never (0.5% of the funds) die/close the subsequent year, whereas
28In the Appendix A1.2, the figure includes those funds that change age-quintile.
29The distribution of observations in each age quintile is presented in figure 4.1.
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Figure 6.3: Persistence in The Old Quintile
Note: This figure presents how old funds behave in the period after their initial ranking. The z-axis
represents the conditional probability of funds being ranked in each subsequent performance quintile or
dies.
11% of poor performers do.
The old funds are less likely to become obsolete, compared to the young funds. This
observation is more obvious when comparing the worst-performing portfolios of young
and old funds, thus, older funds seem to be less sensitive to recent poor performance than
young funds. The funds in the third and worst-performing quintiles are the least likely to
switch quintiles, with 24.7% and 27.7% probability of staying, respectively.
The young and old quintiles seem to embody a common trait. The extreme performers
tend to continue achieving extreme performance. In both age-groups, the top-performers
in one year are most likely to be the worst performers the following year. 24.7% of
the young and 25.6% of the old top-performing portfolios transitions to become worst
performers. While top-performing matured funds making this transition is not a common
finding, young funds have found to behave in this manner (Karoui and Meier, 2009).
Further, 22.1% and 17.5% stay within the top-performing group, respectively. Among the
initial worst-performing group of both age groups, the same is true - they are also most
likely to stay in the worst-performing group the following year. 27% of the young and
27.7% of the old bottom performers stay worst performers. This indicates persistence in
poor performance in both groups, but we cannot draw any statistical conclusion from this
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test.
From the contingency table, we derive at a certain narrative. There is no evidence of
persistence among top-performers in either age group, however there are slight indications
that poor performance is persistent, in line with Carhart (1997). The initial superior
performance followed by sudden poor performance suggests that good performance is due
to risk taking rather than skill. We do not find support for the findings of Verbeek and
Huij (2006), that young funds exhibit higher levels of persistence. The death of young
funds are more correlated with their performance last year, which fits the arguments of
Chevalier and Ellison (1999a) stating that the probability of young funds being taken
down is more sensitive to prior performance.
6.5 Robustness
The estimation window of rolling window alphas, used to perform our multivariate
regression, is only 12 months30. Under other circumstances, a longer estimation window is
preferable to a shorter. However, with our data set we found the number of observations
to be of higher importance as we want to investigate the age of the funds. By increasing
the estimation window we sacrifice most of the first observations we have of each fund.
We investigate how survivorship of funds affect our studies in Table A2.4 in the Appendix.
Survivorship bias occurs as the performance of funds that die is not taken into account.
A high fund age is itself a consequence of good performance in the past. We want to
inspect how the performance of funds in our sample is explained by the fund dying
within our sample period. Is there any difference across age? We regress our performance
measures on FundAge, a dummy indicating that the fund dies and an interaction term. A
significant interaction term indicates that age of dead funds significantly affect performance.
When not controlling for any other variables, we find that the interaction term is
significant in explaining CAPMni,t at a 5% significant level, at a low economic value
of negative 0.3 basis points, that older funds that die affect performance more significantly
downwards. Survivorship bias is usually related to young funds being measured to achieve
higher risk-adjusted returns. Our findings indicate that an increased age yields higher
30There is no exact answer to how many data points to use in a rolling regression. However, a study
on the use of multi-factor models in performance studies suggests using 36 months (Huij and Verbeek,
2009), a suggestion often followed in academia.
6.5 Robustness 51
returns, contradicting to what is expected with survivorship bias present. If there still is
survivorship present, we therefore argue that our findings would be more significant.
Incubation bias occurs when the fund family employs an incubation strategy. Incubation
is in its essence that several funds are created, but only the best performers are actually
registered and is offered to the public. This form of bias is mostly know to affect data
on hedge funds, but is argued also to be affecting mutual fund data bases(Evans, 2010).
However, by our personal contact with The Norwegian Financial Supervisory Authority
(Personal communication, 30.04.2021), we believe this not to be a problem in our data
set. If incubation bias is an issue, however, we would have to discard observations of
funds the first few years that they are alive and defy the purpose of our research. By
removing the first three years of returns, Evans (2010) report that all incubation bias
is eliminated. Following Ľuboš Pástor et al. (2015) and Karoui and Meier (2009), we
perform a supplementing Long-Short portfolio which is long in the 2nd quantile instead of
the 1st, however still short the 5th quintile. The positive, but insignificant, result we find
using the youngest quintile is eradicated. Our results are reported in Appendix A3.6.
We perform robustness on all our multivariate regressions, in which we split the data
set into two time periods, where the first part is from January 2006 to June 2013, and
the second is from July 2013 to January 2021. We find the coefficient of FundAge to be
negative in the first period, which may indicate that the positive effect that fund age has
in our full sample is recent. We have more observations in our late sample, which may
explain why the aggregate effect in the full sample still is significantly positive.
Persistence studies usually include several time horizons. Adjusting the interval of the
ranking period and the following evaluation period may lead to different results, as
Hendricks et al. (1993) has found that most persistence is eradicated after one year, while
some find it to stay for as long as five years Grinblatt and Titman (1992). Phelps and
Detzel (1997) show evidence that the horizon and performance measure greatly affect the
results.
Brown et al. (2015) argues that persistence in poor fund performance potentially can be
explained with persistence in fund fees. To investigate how the expense ratio is related to
the probability that young funds die, we have created a table which is further discussed
in Appendix A2.2. We find that on average, the funds who die had higher expense ratios
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than those that survive. For funds that are 4 and 5 years old, the difference in the expense
ratio of those who survive and those who die is significant a 1% level, which may support
the notion that young funds performing consistently poorly do so to some degree because
they charge high fees.
6.5.1 Look-Ahead Bias
Our proposed research question regarding persistence is challenged by yet another source
of bias. The nature of young and old funds and their probability of being dissolved or
merged differ (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). A consequence of this difference is that old
funds to a lesser degree are subject to survivorship bias, following their higher probability
of surviving. Studies of persistence in mutual fund performance have historically not
adjusted for what Horst et al. (2001) call a look-ahead bias, which is a form of ex-post
conditioning. When measuring persistency, it is common to distinguish two different
periods - one that is used to rank the performance of the funds, and another that evaluates
the persistency of their performance. The bias occurs, however, as the evaluation of
portfolio performance is only determined for the funds that survived the both period
(Brown et al., 2015). In effect, only those that survive are contributing to the evaluation
period, and risky funds more often die because they achieve more extreme results (in both
directions). They do find significant bias of the kind they describe, but when they use the
technique on performance studies similar to Carhart (1997), Horst et al. (2001) conclude
that look-ahead bias is of minor importance given results that closely correspond to the
unadjusted findings of Carhart. As we create rebalancing equal-weighted portfolios on
all available fund returns, not only those who survive for the whole evaluation period,
we believe that we mitigate some of the problem they warn against. Look-ahead bias is
further investigated in table A2.2 in the Appendix.
6.5.2 Econometric Pitfalls
In our multivariate study, we include several variables that we have explained to be related
to similar effects. NumOfStocks and Top10Holdings are, in our view, both determinants
of diversification. Our OLS model may be subject to violation of the assumption of no
perfect multicollinearity, thus, returning instability in the estimated regression coefficients.
For the purpose of formally testing for multicollinearity, we perform a VIF-test. Test
6.5 Robustness 53
values exceeding 10 indicate that multicollinearity is a problem according to Wooldridge
(2009). The test results from our VIF-test are presented in Appendix A3.1, alongside a
correlation matrix in Appendix A3.2. With a VIF-test value of only 1.15 on average, we
conclude on not having issues regarding multicollinearity in our econometric models.
6.5.3 Limitations
Our research is based on models to make statements about performance, which are
assuming efficient markets. Efficient market theory suggests that market participants
respond to information such that the market reflects all this information. The assumption
is being scrutinized by many researchers, as there are evidence of both slow and premature
reactions to new information in the market. Furthermore, "friday earnings" and fact
that weather and sports events affect prices implies market inefficiency (Hirshleifer and
Shumway, 2003). These apparently unexplainable effects which result in abnormal returns
may be attributable to risk premiums that we are still unaware of, or might indicate that
the markets are inefficient, or even that the model is incorrect. The notion of inefficient
markets depends on a model to even be evaluated. Given that the model assumes efficient
markets we have not yet been able to affirm any of the two. The alpha and the benchmark
are simultaneously determined. This issue is often referred to as the joint hypothesis
problem (Jarrow and Larsson, 2012). The EMH is not falsifiable, but as alternatives are
lacking, we are forced to endure any weakness that such assumptions imply.
In addition, there is evidence that higher exposure to the market risk factor is not
necessarily correlated with higher returns (Frazzini and Pedersen, 2014). Empirical
evidence supports the notion that low beta securities, combined with leverage, will
outperform high beta securities. According to Fama and French (2015a), such beta
anomaly is accounted for by introducing new factors. The uncertainty of the usability
of such benchmark models is still disputed. Even when the five-factor model was first
introduced Fama and French (2015b), it was described as an incomplete description of
expected returns, with a GRS statistic by Shanken et al. (1989) that was less than 5
percent.
Fama and French (1993) guide the reader in how to interpret the model they develop.
While one interpretation is that the factors serve as available alternative investment
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portfolios, they argue that one cannot form such portfolios and rebalance them often
enough without incurring transaction costs. Their interpretation is that these factors only
serve as means of explaining the returns, not serve as zero-investment portfolios. The
same goes for the UMD-factor, which to an even larger degree demands rebalancing.
The degree to which factor models are able to explain security returns does vary across
sample periods and markets. (Ferreira et al., 2013) finds that the SMB factor is not
significant in European countries. In their discussion of model application, Fama and
French (2015b) point out that they find the HML factor to be redundant, after the addition
of the profitability and investment factors. They do, however, suggest that this result may
be specific to their sample.
Lastly, as we have discussed in subsection 4.1.1, we use international factors to assess risk-
adjusted performance. Sørensen (2009) argues that using risk-factors constructed within
each funds’ investment mandate more accurately measures risk-adjusted performance,
and directly assesses skill rather than allocation decisions. We argue that capital flows
freely across borders, that some funds self-report what benchmark they measure against
ex-post, and that large economies such as the US make most of the global equities. For




In this thesis, we have studied how the age of Nordic funds is related to performance,
risk-taking and investment style. Our data sets are free of survivorship bias, and contain
1198(net, 1138 gross) Nordic equity funds in the period of January 2006 to February
2021. In our literature review we find inconsistent evidence regarding how risk-adjusted
performance, risk-taking and investment style is affected by fund age in the mutual fund
industry. Based on this literature, we made the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Fund age affects the performance of mutual funds
Hypothesis 2: Fund age affects risk-taking of mutual funds
Hypothesis 3: Fund age affects the investment style of mutual funds
Hypothesis 4: Investment strategies based on fund age outperform on a
risk-adjusted basis
To evaluate risk-adjusted performance, we apply the one-,three-, four- and five-factor
models on both net and gross returns. When controlling for other fund characteristics that
may affect performance, our findings are clear. The Nordic mutual fund market is not
efficient considering that it is possible to achieve superior returns by looking at a funds
age. These findings do not follow that of previous research, where fund age typically is
found to have a deteriorating effect on performance (Webster, 2002; Ferreira et al., 2013).
Secondly, we find that an increased age leads to less risk-taking on all our risk metrics
when controlling for fund characteristics. These findings are in line with prior research,
which argues that this can be caused by a more substantial incentive in younger funds to
take on risk at the end of the year if they have performed poorly(Chevalier and Ellison,
1997; Karoui and Meier, 2009).
Furthermore, we find that as fund age increases, funds are less likely to be exposed towards
overall market risk, but inherit a style of investing that is more exposed towards other risk
factors. Our results does not support Karoui and Meier (2009) who found younger funds
to be more exposed towards small and less liquid stocks, captured by the SMB-factor.
These findings are, however, in line with research that argues that younger funds are more
likely to avoid deviation from market benchmarks (Chevalier and Ellison, 1999b) as they
are more sensitive to fund out-flow.
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Moreover, when testing investment strategies based on fund age, we do not find evidence
of any difference in performance between young and old funds in a hypothetical long-
short portfolio. Our findings contradict the existing literature finding such portfolios to
outperform (Ľuboš Pástor et al., 2015; Karoui and Meier, 2009).
Lastly, neither age-quintile demonstrates persistence, as we do not find evidence that
investors are able to outperform the benchmark with strategies based on previous
performance. Hence, it seems hard to find an ex-ante criterion based on fund age
that will outperform the market.
Contrary to what previous studies on funds in the US and Europe suggest, our research
suggests that funds actually do age well in the Nordic countries.
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Figure A1.1: Average Values of Control Variables Against Fund Age
Note: At high ages (>35), we have very few observations, which makes the graph returns
values representative only for a few funds. Top percentile p(99) of the fund age variable is
34 years.
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Figure A1.2: Persistence in The Young Quintile, Including Transistions to 2nd Quintile
Note: This figure presents how young funds behave in the period after their initial ranking.
The z-axis represents the conditional probability of funds being ranked in each subsequent
performance quintile or dies. In addition, the figure includes funds that change from 1st
quintile to 2nd quintile during the evaluation period.
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Table A2.1: Description of Variables
Variable (1) Description (2) Source (3)
Rxi,t
Fund i’s monthly return where x denotes whether net
returns (n) or gross returns fee (g) are used. Morningstar Direct
Rf,t Risk free rate at time t. Kenneth French









Fund i’s exposure to their top 10 holdings in period t,
measured in percent. Morningstar Direct
NumOfStocksi,t Fund i’s number of stock holdings in period t Morningstar Direct
ExpenseRatioi,t
Fund i’s monthly expense ratio at time t. Measured in
percent. Morningstar Direct
Turnoveri,t Fund i’s yearly turnover, in percent Morningstar Direct
FundRiskxi,t
Fund i’s standard deviation at time t based on a 12
month rolling period. The x denotes whether net or




Fund i’s loading on the market portfolio from CAPM
at time t based on a 12-month rolling regression.The x





Fund i’s standard deviation of the residual from CAPM
model at time t based on a 12 month rolling regression.





Fund i’s loading on the MKT-factor from the FF5F
five-factor model at time t based on a 12 month rolling






Variable (1) Description (2) Source (3)
SMBxi,t
Fund i’s loading on the SMB-factor from the FF5F
five-factor model at time t based on a 12 month rolling






Fund i’s loading on the HML-factor from the FF5F
five-factor model at time t based on a 12 month rolling






Fund i’s loading on the RMW-factor from the FF5F
five-factor model at time t based on a 12 month rolling






Fund i’s loading on the CMA factor from the FF5F
five-factor model at time t based on a 12 month rolling






Fund i’s abnormal return using CAPM one-factor model
at time t based on a 12 month rolling regression. The x






Fund i’s abnormal return using FF3F three-factor
model at time t based on a 12 month rolling regression.






Fund i’s abnormal return using CARHART four-factor
model at time t based on a 12 month rolling regression.






Fund i’s abnormal return using FF5F five factor model
at time t based on a 12 month rolling regression. The x






Dummy that returns 1 if the fund i has an obsolete




Table A2.2: Look Ahead Bias
Age Living Died Total / Difference
1
Frequency (return) 969 26 995
Avg return % 0,73 -0,36 1,08***
Frequency (expense) 703 10 713
Avg expense ratio % 0,132 0,142 -0,009
2
Frequency (return) 905 53 958
Avg return % 0,58 -0,03 0,61***
Frequency (expense) 729 37 766
Avg expense ratio % 0,133 0,147 -0,014
3
Frequency (return) 859 53 912
Avg return % 0,48 -0,26 0,75***
Frequency (expense) 733 42 775
Avg expense ratio % 0,136 0,138 -0,002
4
Frequency (return) 795 50 845
Avg return % 0,42 0,13 0,30***
Frequency (expense) 717 43 760
Avg expense ratio % 0,136 0,150 -0,015***
5
Frequency (return) 718 68 786
Avg return % 0,46 -0,02 0,48***
Frequency (expense) 663 61 724
Avg expense ratio % 0,136 0,162 -0,026***
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: We consider all observations of funds that are of age one through five years,
which we find to be representative of young funds. We characterize each fund as
either "Living" and "Died", that is, if a fund dies when its age is between one
and two full years, it will be regarded as "Died" at Age 1. For each fund i, we
calculate the average return it achieved the full year prior to the present age. In
this case, those who died at age 1 performed with an average of negative 0.36%
per month it was less than one year old. To compare those surviving and those
who do not in terms of their prior performance, we want to perform a formal test
in which we hypothesise the two groups to have a mean difference of zero. The
formal test is often a regular t-test. As we deal with small populations, may suffer
from some shortcomings. We perform Shapiro Wilkinson tests, in which the null
hypothesis is that the variable is normally distributed. We are not able to reject
the null hypothesis, and must therefore use a Wilcox rank test instead, which is
non-parametric. The p-value of each test is represented with (*), as described below
the table.
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Table A2.3: Dead funds - Quintile 1 and 5
Panel A: Young Panel B: Old
CAPMni,t FF3FMni,t CARHARTni,t FF5FMni,t CAPMni,t FF3FMni,t CARHARTni,t FF5FMni,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 0.159∗∗∗ 0.0003 −0.102∗∗∗ 0.022 −0.054 −0.865∗∗∗ −0.911∗∗∗ −0.738∗∗∗
t = 4.886 t = 0.008 t = −2.827 t = 0.514 t = −1.236 t = −16.743 t = −17.584 t = −12.363
FundAgei,t −0.135∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
t = −14.825 t = −9.570 t = −5.390 t = −8.493 t = −6.904 t = 8.175 t = 9.606 t = 5.098
DeadDummyi 0.012 −0.199∗∗∗ −0.250∗∗∗ −0.093 −0.107 0.096 −0.359∗∗∗ 0.173
t = 0.239 t = −3.485 t = −4.313 t = −1.375 t = −1.048 t = 0.795 t = −2.969 t = 1.245
FundAge x DeadDummy −0.074∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.128∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.017∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.019∗∗∗
t = −5.042 t = −5.777 t = −4.425 t = −6.683 t = −0.883 t = −3.423 t = 0.413 t = −3.270
Observations 22,101 22,101 22,101 22,101 21,974 21,974 21,974 21,974
R2 0.030 0.038 0.028 0.031 0.007 0.013 0.015 0.007
Adjusted R2 0.030 0.038 0.028 0.031 0.006 0.013 0.015 0.007
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: We consider all observations of funds that are of age one through five years, which we find to be representative of young funds. We characterize each fund as either
"Living" and "Died", that is, if a fund dies when its age is between one and two full years, it will be regarded as "Died" at Age 1. For each fund i, we calculate the average return
it achieved the full year.
Table A2.4: Dead funds - Full sample
Panel A: Complete data set
CAPMni,t FF3FMni,t CARHARTni,t FF5FMni,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant −0.279∗∗∗ −0.398∗∗∗ −0.373∗∗∗ −0.354∗∗∗
t = −28.467 t = −35.549 t = −33.316 t = −26.929
FundAgei,t −0.006∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.001 −0.004∗∗∗
t = −9.304 t = −2.080 t = −0.764 t = −4.711
DeadDummyi −0.123∗∗∗ −0.328∗∗∗ −0.340∗∗∗ −0.334∗∗∗
t = −7.523 t = −17.555 t = −18.158 t = −15.196
FundAge x DeadDummy −0.003∗∗ −0.002∗ 0.0002 −0.001
t = −2.275 t = −1.707 t = 0.178 t = −0.889
Observations 110,173 110,173 110,173 110,173
R2 0.004 0.011 0.010 0.008
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.011 0.010 0.008
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: We consider all observations of funds that are of age one through five years, which we find to be
representative of young funds. We characterize each fund as either "Living" and "Died", that is, if a fund
dies when its age is between one and two full years, it will be regarded as "Died" at Age 1. For each fund












Notes: This table presents the VIF-test.
Table A3.2: Correlation Matrix
FundAgei,t FundSizei,t Top10Holdingsi,t ExpenseRatioi,t NumOfStocksi,t Turnoveri,t
FundAgei,t 1
FundSizei,t 0.25 1
Top10Holdingsi,t 0.02 -0.12 1
ExpenseRatioi,t -0.09 -0.19 0.17 1
NumOfStocksi,t 0.02 0.25 -0.41 -0.21 1
Turnoveri,t -0.09 -0.11 -0.01 0.13 -0.01 1
Notes: This table presents a correlation matrix for control variables used in the multivariate regression. .
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Table A3.3: Robustness - Different Time Horizon - Fund Return
Panel A: Net Returns
January 2006 - June 2013 July 2013 - February 2021
CAPMni,t FF3FMni,t CARHARTni,t FF5FMni,t CAPMni,t FF3FMni,t CARHARTni,t FF5FMni,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FundAgei,t −0.313∗∗∗ −0.402∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.234∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗
t = −21.181 t = −23.515 t = −3.928 t = −13.161 t = 2.800 t = 15.597 t = 13.738 t = 19.310
Time Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Segment Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 48,157 48,157 48,157 48,157 60,538 60,538 60,538 60,538
R2 0.199 0.154 0.039 0.055 0.021 0.057 0.039 0.084
Adjusted R2 0.183 0.138 0.021 0.037 0.004 0.042 0.024 0.068
Panel B: Gross Return
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FundAgei,t −0.297∗∗∗ −0.395∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗ −0.215∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗
t = −19.334 t = −22.631 t = −4.325 t = −11.943 t = 4.442 t = 19.002 t = 16.847 t = 22.583
Time Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Segment Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 43,985 43,985 43,985 43,985 58,043 58,043 58,043 58,043
R2 0.219 0.193 0.042 0.065 0.016 0.066 0.041 0.098
Adjusted R2 0.204 0.177 0.023 0.046 0.0004 0.051 0.026 0.084
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: This table presents results based on the analysis found in table 6.1. This table presents a regression of an equal- and value-weighted portfolio
that is long in funds of the 2nd quintile and short in funds of 5th quintile (Q2-Q5). The portfolio returns are used as the dependent variable. Alphat
represents the abnormal returns of the long-short strategy. Panel A and Panel B displays estimations constructed with Net and Gross returns,
respectively. Each panel displays results of portfolios formed on Equal-Weighted and Value-Weighted returns separately.
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Table A3.4: Robustness - Different Time Horizon - Fund Risk
Panel A: Net Returns
January 2006 - June 2013 July 2013 - February 2021
FundRiskni,t SysRiskni,t UnsysRiskni,t FundRiskni,t SysRiskni,t UnsysRiskni,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FundAgei,t 0.450∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
t = 16.570 t = 20.098 t = −8.055 t = 39.845 t = −8.118 t = 3.324
Time Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Segment Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 48,157 48,157 48,157 60,538 60,538 60,538
R2 0.226 0.087 0.307 0.217 0.009 0.028
Adjusted R2 0.211 0.070 0.294 0.204 −0.007 0.012
Panel B: Gross Returns












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FundAgei,t 0.306∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ −0.183∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.007
t = 10.857 t = 16.610 t = −13.241 t = 40.587 t = −9.262 t = −1.343
Time Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Segment Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 43,985 43,985 43,985 58,043 58,043 58,043
R2 0.239 0.069 0.344 0.203 0.012 0.008
Adjusted R2 0.224 0.050 0.331 0.190 −0.004 −0.008
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: This table presents results based on the analysis found in table 6.2. The table presents the coefficient and
t-statistic on FundAgei,t. All control variables used in our analysis are included in the regression, but unreported in
the table. The sample is split into two sub samples based on time, the first presents evidence from January of 2006
to June of 2013, and the second presents evidence from July of 2013 to February of 2021. All standard errors are
clustered at the fund level.
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Table A3.5: Robustness - Different Time Horizon - Factor Loadings
Panel A: Net Returns
January 2006 - June 2013 July 2013 - February 2021
MKTni,t SMBni,t HMLni,t RMWni,t CMAni,t MKTni,t SMBni,t HMLni,t RMWni,t CMAni,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
FundAgei,t 0.033∗∗∗ −0.195∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ −0.001 0.002 0.209∗∗∗
t = 5.446 t = −22.401 t = −7.264 t = −9.894 t = 18.015 t = −22.944 t = 18.760 t = −0.290 t = 0.326 t = 21.543
Time Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Segment Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 48,157 48,157 48,157 48,157 48,157 60,538 60,538 60,538 60,538 60,538
R2 0.081 0.164 0.018 0.019 0.051 0.048 0.062 0.006 0.003 0.087
Adjusted R2 0.063 0.148 −0.001 0.0002 0.033 0.032 0.046 −0.011 −0.014 0.072
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
Panel B: Gross Returns




















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
FundAgei,t 0.038∗∗∗ −0.221∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ −0.168∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗ −0.016∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗
t = 6.158 t = −26.700 t = −4.946 t = −11.935 t = 20.227 t = −29.167 t = 25.811 t = −2.308 t = −2.481 t = 20.570
Time Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Segment Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 43,985 43,985 43,985 43,985 43,985 58,043 58,043 58,043 58,043 58,043
R2 0.072 0.168 0.020 0.027 0.058 0.074 0.085 0.010 0.003 0.086
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.152 0.0001 0.008 0.039 0.059 0.070 −0.006 −0.013 0.071
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: This table presents results based on the analysis found in table 6.3. The table presents the coefficient and t-statistic on FundAgei,t. All control variables used in our
analysis are included in the regression, but unreported in the table. The sample is split into two sub samples based on time, the first presents evidence from January of
2006 to June of 2013, and the second presents evidence from July of 2013 to February of 2021. All standard errors are clustered at the fund level.
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Table A3.6: Robustness - Long 2nd Q Short 5th Q Net Returns

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Alphat −0.056 −0.052 −0.050 −0.039 0.006 0.012 0.013 0.007
t = −1.164 t = −1.058 t = −1.041 t = −0.789 t = 0.082 t = 0.157 t = 0.160 t = 0.093
MKTt −0.031∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗ −0.033∗ −0.034∗ −0.039∗∗
t = −2.947 t = −2.425 t = −3.019 t = −2.958 t = −2.164 t = −1.752 t = −1.757 t = −2.011
SMBt −0.020 −0.022 −0.016 −0.028 −0.029 −0.008
t = −0.946 t = −1.077 t = −0.728 t = −0.833 t = −0.843 t = −0.234
HMLt 0.013 −0.004 0.043∗∗ 0.019 0.016 0.060∗
t = 0.733 t = −0.228 t = 2.049 t = 0.656 t = 0.502 t = 1.816
UMDt −0.029∗∗ −0.005
t = −2.423 t = −0.274
CMAt −0.101∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗
t = −2.717 t = −2.430
RMWt 0.021 0.110∗∗
t = 0.658 t = 2.193
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180
R2 0.047 0.053 0.083 0.093 0.026 0.031 0.031 0.086
Adjusted R2 0.041 0.036 0.062 0.067 0.020 0.014 0.009 0.060

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Alphat −0.086∗ −0.075 −0.074 −0.060 −0.051 −0.038 −0.037 −0.028
t = −1.797 t = −1.556 t = −1.549 t = −1.218 t = −0.655 t = −0.475 t = −0.461 t = −0.343
MKTt −0.019∗ −0.017 −0.026∗∗ −0.025∗∗ −0.025 −0.022 −0.028 −0.031
t = −1.820 t = −1.484 t = −2.191 t = −2.050 t = −1.457 t = −1.145 t = −1.393 t = −1.563
SMBt −0.029 −0.031 −0.027 −0.041 −0.043 −0.029
t = −1.362 t = −1.520 t = −1.261 t = −1.178 t = −1.230 t = −0.832
HMLt 0.028 0.009 0.055∗∗∗ 0.037 0.024 0.080∗∗
t = 1.579 t = 0.454 t = 2.651 t = 1.262 t = 0.762 t = 2.341
UMDt −0.032∗∗∗ −0.021
t = −2.735 t = −1.077
CMAt −0.091∗∗ −0.147∗∗
t = −2.467 t = −2.416
RMWt 0.005 0.059
t = 0.161 t = 1.148
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180
R2 0.018 0.037 0.077 0.070 0.012 0.025 0.031 0.063
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.021 0.055 0.043 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.036
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: This table presents a regression of Rxi,t - Rf,t (excess return) as the dependent variable, where x denotes the portfolio of which is risk-adjusted. The
dependent variable is the factor-loading estimated with a rolling regression with the five risk-factors proposed by Fama and French (2015b) at each time t for each
fund i. The regressions are estimated with the use of time, segment and fund fixed effects. All variables are defined according to the detailed description in
Appendix A2.1. Panel A and Panel B displays estimations constructed with Net and Gross returns, respectively. Each panel displays results of portfolios formed
on Equal-Weighted and Value-Weighted returns separately. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level.
